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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to analyze how recessions affect the relative economic 
performance between firms by measuring the short-term stability of Norwegian firms’ 
competitive advantages and disadvantages during the financial crisis of 2008. Further, 
analyses will be conducted to determine whether specific firm characteristics affect the 
changes in their short-term stability. Financial data on Norwegian firms for the period 1999-
2010 was analyzed in order to investigate these issues. Our results show that i) the financial 
crisis of 2008 had considerable negative impact on the aggregate firm performance of 
Norwegian firms, and the effect was more severe for poorly performing firms than for well 
performing firms, ii) firms’ competitive advantages were less stable in crisis, and more stable 
in booms, and iii) different firm characteristics like size, leverage and growth affected the 
effect of the crisis on the short-term stability of firms’ competitive advantages. Finally, we 
give some directions for future studies. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Introduction to the study 
The global economy is characterized by business cycles, i.e. booms and recessions which 
occur regularly and influence the national economies of many countries. When it comes to 
economic crises, firms will react in different ways to deal with the new and more challenging 
rules of the game. It is known that the average performance of firms declines in recessions 
(Geroski & Gregg, 1997), but we do not know what happens to the relative performance. How 
do recessions influence the short-term stability of firms’ competitive advantages or 
disadvantages? Firm characteristics like size, leverage and sales growth may contribute to the 
outcome. The most recent economic crisis is the financial crisis of 2008, the biggest one since 
the 1930’s Great Depression, and it affected the worldwide economy considerably, including 
Norway. Previous studies have investigated the crisis’ impact on Norwegian firms, but there 
are still many unanswered questions related to the stability of firms’ competitive advantages 
and disadvantages during crisis. 
 
1.2 Positioning of the study 
The term «sustained competitive advantage» has been subject of considerable debate, 
particularly with regard to the fact that competitive advantages, or disadvantages, have 
become more short-term and unstable (D'Aveni et al., 2010). A related, but little explored 
issue is how business cycles affect the short-term stability and duration of competitive 
advantages and disadvantages. There has not been conducted much research in the strategic 
management field on how firms and industries are affected by recessions, and most of the 
literature that touches upon these topics is a byproduct from research of product market 
implications in the financial field or from macroeconomic theory. It would therefore be 
interesting to present new research in another framework different from the existing one.  
 
When it comes to conducting economic research on the topic, it should be possible to do it 
with empiricism and real life settings, as long as the so-called “natural experiment” allows 
“the study of the effects of exogenous variation in an explanatory variable that is in other 
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situations endogenously related to the outcome of interest” (Meyer, 1995). In other words, we 
can investigate the idea of short-term stability of competitive advantages or disadvantages in 
recessions as long as there is a considerable fall in the key financial ratios that we use to 
compute the competitive advantage variable. 
 
1.3 Structure and clarification of the study 
Our study will be highly structured, and it has nine different chapters, including references 
and appendices. In the first chapter, we introduce the topic, our research question and 
implications of the study. The second chapter will present the theoretical background of the 
topic, which we will complement with existing literature in chapter three. The main 
connection between these two chapters is that the theoretical background will present main 
theories and concepts which the research in the literature review builds on. The research we 
present in the literature review is specific to the thesis topic, and gives an account of what 
accredited scholars and researchers have already published. The literature that we choose to 
include gives grounds for our hypotheses, and at the same time it helps us explain some of our 
findings from the analyses. 
 
The fourth chapter presents the research design, methodological choices and validity concerns 
of our study. We give a thorough review of our data, our samples and our analyses, including 
descriptions of the variables and measures. This part is supposed to make the study as 
transparent and airtight as possible, and clarify the research process. The hypotheses that we 
want to test are based on the literature review, and are presented in chapter five. Chapter six 
contains the analyses of the dataset and the presentation of the results, while we continue with 
our in-depth discussion of the findings in chapter seven. This chapter will also contain 
recommendations and directions for future studies, together with limitations of our study. 
 
We want to clarify some important terms and parts of the study, in order to avoid possible 
misinterpretations by the reader and to get a clearer understanding of the arguments and 
purpose of this thesis. Before we obtained our data and formulated our research question, we 
were interested in the duration and sustainability of firms’ competitive advantages and 
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disadvantages during recessions, since there is little existing research or empirical evidence on 
the matter. In order to investigate this area, one needs data from several years, although the 
exact number of years which defines a sustainable competitive advantage is more uncertain. 
The existing theory about sustainability will be dealt with in the theoretical background of this 
study. In spite of ambiguous theory regarding the number of years needed to define 
sustainability, we saw the necessity to put down a limit based on relevant information from 
which we could draw conclusions. Most importantly, we consider sustainability to hang 
together with the expression long-term. Long-term can be a subjective denomination that 
depends on the setting in which it can convey meaning. For instance, a day trader might 
consider long-term much differently than a buy-and-hold investor, who would consider 
anything less than several years to be short-term trading. In our case, we knew that we were 
going to work with firm accounts and financial crises, and we therefore think of long-term as 
a period of several years. The implication of this definition on our thesis is that the financial 
crisis of 2008 is too close in time for us to investigate the sustainability of competitive 
advantages and disadvantages. The proximity to the recent financial crisis makes it difficult to 
say anything about the long-term evolution of firms’ competitive advantages. Thus, what we 
will do is to conduct analyses consisting of 1- and 2-year correlations, and focus on the short-
term stability of competitive advantages and disadvantages instead of the sustainability. With 
the term stability, we think of the development of competitive advantages and disadvantages 
from year to year, i.e. if firms which have competitive advantage/disadvantage one year will 
maintain it in the following one or two years. Our focus is not deep case-specific details of the 
shock, but rather the broader patterns. Since there has been conducted little research on the 
topic and this study is one of the first contributions to the field, it seems natural to begin with 
investigating the short-term effects of the crisis before looking at the long-term effects. When 
short-term effects have been investigated, one can more easily justify that prospective 
continuations of this study can focus on long-term effects. 
 
The next thing we want to clarify is how we are going to denominate competitive advantages 
and disadvantages throughout the study. We consider it to be cumbersome and inconvenient 
to use the entire phrase and we will therefore limit ourselves to write only “competitive 
advantage,” when we in reality are talking about both advantages and disadvantages. 
Disadvantages can thus be understood as negative advantages. 
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1.4 Research question 
In order to embark on the existing research gaps, we have developed the following research 
question: 
 
How do business cycles affect the short-term stability of the relative economic 
performance between firms, and how might specific firm characteristics influence the 
crisis’ effect on the short-term stability of firms’ competitive advantages and 
disadvantages? 
 
When answering this research question, we subsequently want to illuminate which 
performance variables that are most affected by economic fluctuations, how firm size, capital 
structure and sales growth influence the results, and what the explanations might be for the 
patterns we observe. Thus, we hope to broaden knowledge in the strategic management field, 
as well as developing guidelines and suggestions for future research on the short-term stability 
of competitive advantages during business cycles. 
 
1.5 Implications of the study 
The main purpose of this study is to provide new knowledge on how firms’ relative 
performance is affected by recessions. We will investigate this by measuring the short-term 
stability of Norwegian firms’ competitive advantages during the financial crisis of 2008, and 
we hope to be able to generalize our findings to other recessions. The study is part of the 
NHH research project Crisis, Restructuring and Growth, and the results of the study will 
provide directions for future studies within the project, but also for outside researchers 
investigating the same issues. As there are considerable gaps in the strategic management 
literature on how recessions affect the relative performance of firms, this study is expected to 
contribute to the field. 
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2. Theoretical background 
2.1 Introduction 
In this section, the theoretical foundations of this thesis will be presented. The main focus is 
on competitive advantage, but some theory of corporate finance and recessions will also be 
presented.  The theory on competitive advantage has its origin from the strategic management 
field, and is the background for our study. Financial characteristics are necessary to include 
because they make it possible to quantify the competitive advantage variables, while 
recessionary pressures affect the dynamics of these variables. Together, this will be the basis 
for understanding how and why the short-term stability of competitive advantages may 
change during recessions. The theoretical background presented in this section will lay the 
foundations for the literature review in chapter 3. 
 
2.2 Strategic management foundations 
2.2.1 Competitive advantage 
Barney (2007) describes competitive advantage as a firm being able to create more economic 
value than rival firms. In other words, a company has a competitive advantage when it has 
better returns than the industry mean. Economic value is the difference between the perceived 
benefits obtained by a consumer who buys a firm’s products or services, and the full 
economic cost of these products or services. This improved profitability comes from a firm 
being better at creating value in some way or another, which may be done by having lower 
costs, offering a better product, or by a combination of the two (Barney, 2007). There are 
several possible sources of competitive advantages; being able to get the most output from a 
minimum of input enables a low-cost strategy, and focusing on innovation and customer 
orientation may provide better products or lower costs that make the firm achieve a higher 
perceived quality from the customer.  
 
2.2.2 The Resource Based View of the firm and competitive advantage 
Some firms are able to develop and implement strategies that generate high profit levels even 
in competitively difficult environments and industries, while other firms operate in favorable 
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industries, but still choose to implement poor strategies that do not generate profit (Barney, 
2007). By conducting an industry analysis, the opportunities and threats in a specific industry 
are identified. However, this is not enough to determine whether a firm is going to be able to 
have competitive advantages in that industry. There exists a complementary view which 
concentrates on the identification of each firm’s strengths and weaknesses by looking at their 
resources. 
 
Resources may be defined as stocks of inputs that affect the company’s relative ability to 
implement product market strategies (Jakobsen & Lien, 2001). Penrose (1959) divides firm 
resources into two main groups: physical resources and human resources. Physical resources 
consist of land, natural resources, factories, raw materials, byproducts and finished goods, 
while human resources are labor and managerial staff. Barney (2007) extends Penrose’s take 
on it by adding two more categories: financial capital, which are the different money 
resources, and organizational capital, which is a firm’s structure, systems, culture and 
reputation, as well as more informal relationships. The resources are not the actual inputs in a 
production process, but rather a bundle of different potential services that can be combined in 
many different ways and quantities, depending on the environment. Besanko et al. (2010) 
explain that resources both directly and indirectly can have an impact on a firm’s profitability; 
they can directly affect the firm’s ability to create more value than other firms, and they can 
indirectly affect value-creation because they serve as the basis of the firm’s capabilities. 
Recessions influence firm resources in an important way. Part of what characterizes a crisis is 
that the resource value is either lost or altered. This is because the demand is twisted in such a 
way that what a firm is good at is now being judged differently. Market demand and 
competition both change, which contributes to the changing of the value of a firm’s resources. 
 
The idea of resource-based theory is that firms differ with respect to the resources they 
possess. This implies that firms vary in terms of what activities they can perform 
exceptionally well. To look at the firm as a collection of productive resources administered by 
the firm’s decision makers, instead of just simple production functions stems from the work of 
Penrose (1959), and the term “the resource-based view of the firm” was first coined by Birger 
Wernerfelt (1984). The main features of the resource-based view is resource heterogeneity 
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and resource immobility; that firms compete with different sets of resources and that these 
resources only partially can be moved or copied (Barney, 2007). These two assumptions must 
be fulfilled in order to make the firm able to create economic value. Competitive advantage is 
thus created by exploiting those valuable, distinctive resources that cannot easily be copied.  
 
2.2.3 The sustainability of competitive advantages 
The fundamental basis of above average performance in the long run is sustainable 
competitive advantage (Porter, 1985). For a competitive advantage to be sustainable, it must 
be underpinned by resources that are scarce and imperfectly mobile, which means that well-
functioning markets for resources and capabilities cannot exist (Besanko et al., 2010). This 
brings us to the VRIO framework of analysis, developed by Barney (1991). For firm 
resources to be a source of sustained competitive advantage, they need to be valuable, rare, 
imperfectly imitable, and there cannot be strategically equivalent substitutes for these 
resources. This theory thus says that a firm has a sustained competitive advantage when the 
uniqueness of product-market strategies can be sustained in equilibrium. Barney (1991) does 
not refer to a calendar period when talking about the sustainability of a competitive 
advantage, but claims that it depends on the possibility of competitive duplication, and that 
the competitive advantage is sustained only if it continues to exist after efforts to duplicate 
that advantage have ended. 
 
Peteraf (1993) extends Barney’s framework of sustained competitive advantage, while 
drawing on Ricardo’s (1817) focus on the economics of rent, also called price theory. She 
claims that resources yield sustained competitive advantages when four conditions are met: 
resource heterogeneity, ex post limits to competition, imperfect mobility and ex ante limits to 
competition. Thus, a firm bases a sustained competitive advantage on differential rents in 
excess of opportunity costs in equilibrium (Foss, 2005). As an inspiration for Peteraf’s (2009) 
work on the resource-based view, Ricardo (1817) looked at the economic consequences of the 
“original, unaugmentable, and indestructible gifts of Nature,” i.e. that some firms possess 
resources which are scarce and limited in supply. These resources give these firms lower 
average costs than other firms. Because of the inelastic supply curves they cannot expand 
output rapidly, regardless of how high the price may be. Considering this, it is possible for 
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those who have high quality factors of production with inelastic supply to earn an economic 
rent, where economic rent is defined as a payment to an owner of a factor of production above 
the minimum required to bring the factor into employment (Ricardo, 1817). 
 
Agarwal et al. (2009) question the fact that macroeconomic models of industries and 
economies typically start with “representative firms,” implying that all firms in an industry 
are identical, and contrast this with the idea of heterogeneity as one of the critical 
determinants of a competitive advantage. This highlights some of the incompatibility of 
macroeconomic theory versus strategic management theory, and tells us that for the 
competitive advantage to be a reality, we cannot presuppose macroeconomic implications 
when we work out our hypotheses.  
 
2.3  Corporate finance foundations 
There are several measures to corporate profitability; operating profit margin and return on 
assets (ROA) are two of the most common. These two will be used to create the competitive 
advantage variable later in this study. Operating profit margin is the after-tax operating 
income as a percentage of sales (Brealey et al., 2012), in other words it measures the 
proportion of sales that finds its way into profits. Return on assets (ROA) is net income as a 
percentage of total assets. One can break ROA down into the product of asset turnover and 
operating profit margin, and this is often called the Du Pont formula. You would naturally 
prefer both high operating profit margin and high turnover, but a high-price and a high-margin 
strategy would typically result in lower sales per dollar of assets. Firms must therefore make 
trade-offs between the two, and the Du Pont formula can help identify what strategy the firms 
are pursuing. What we can see is that grocery stores which tend to have high average turnover 
ratios have lower average profit margins, and that electric and water utilities have high 
margins and low turnovers (Brealey et al., 2012). 
 
In finance theory, capital structure is defined as the mix of long-term debt and equity 
financing (Brealey et al., 2012). Miller & Modigliani’s (1958) well-known proposition 1, the 
debt-irrelevance proposition, claims that “when there are no taxes and capital markets 
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function well, the market value of a company does not depend on its capital structure. In other 
words, financial managers cannot increase value by changing the mix of securities used to 
finance the company.” Only changes in the company’s real assets will affect company value. 
Even though more debt financing increases earnings per share for shareholders, it is offset by 
the fact that shareholders now hold more financial risk and therefore require a higher return 
on their shares. The share price will be exactly the same as before restructuring. However, 
many critics of this proposition state that since the real world scenario involves taxes, 
financial distress, bankruptcy costs and conflict of interest among shareholders, the 
proposition does not hold. 
 
The pecking order theory suggests that firms prefer internal finance, but if that is not enough 
and external finance is required, firms issue debt first and equity only as a last resort. This is 
because an issue of debt is less likely to be interpreted by investors as a bad omen, because 
there is less scope for debt to be misvalued. The explanation for why the most profitable firms 
borrow less is that they do not need outside money, while less profitable firms borrow more 
because they do not have enough internal funds to invest with, which makes debt first in the 
pecking order for finance (Brealey et al., 2012). The pecking order says something about how 
much leverage a firm has, and the implications this will have for firms during recessions will 
be discussed in the literature review. 
 
2.4 Industries defined 
An industry is defined as “a collection of firms that sell the same or closely related products” 
(Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2005). In our study, the definition presented here will not be used 
directly. Instead, we will use 2-digit NACE codes to classify our industries. These are the 
European Union’s classification system, and also the basis for coding of industries on firms 
and businesses in the Central Coordinating Register in the Brønnøysund Register Centre, and 
in Statistics Norway’s firm- and business register. The industry codes will be used to find an 
industry profitability mean needed to compute the competitive advantage variable. Some of 
these codes may not be perfectly consistent with the definition above, but due to the scope of 
this thesis, we consider it adequate to use the 2-digit NACE-codes to classify industries.  
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2.5 Recessions 
The business cycle is “recurring fluctuations of income relative to potential income. A boom 
describes rising income (relative to potential income) which culminates in a peak. A recession 
describes declining income (relative to potential income) which bottoms out at a trough” 
(Gärtner, 2009). We will treat the economic crisis of 2008 as an exogenous shock on the 
Norwegian economy. This is because the crisis did not have its origin in Norway, but started 
in the U.S. and later spread worldwide. More explicitly, the crisis sprung out of the easy-
money policies that were pursued by the U.S. Federal Reserve and other central banks. The 
widespread availability of mortgage finance increased house prices up until 2006 when they 
started to decline quickly, and people had to default on their mortgages. The financial system 
in the U.S. started to melt down during the autumn of 2008. The supply of credit to industry 
suffered, unemployment rose, and business bankruptcies tripled (Brealey et al., 2012). The 
crisis spread to the rest of the world, where many foreign banks had made huge investments in 
U.S. subprime mortgages. It hit Norway as an exogenous demand shock through reductions in 
aggregate demand for the economy as a whole. 
 
3. Literature review 
3.1 Introduction and empirical challenges 
In this section, literature relevant for this study will be reviewed. The literature presented here 
will be used to formulate the hypotheses that will be tested. While there are numerous studies 
analyzing how firms are affected by recessions, the large majority is related to finance and 
macroeconomics. Lien (2010) claims that most findings relevant for the strategic management 
field are byproducts from work originally studying effects related to finance, macroeconomics 
or IO-economics. At the same time, there is a large amount of literature on competitive 
advantages and the sustainability of these, but very few have discussed this in relation to 
recessions. Thus, the effect a crisis has on firms’ competitive advantages is unknown as of 
today. We will first present some facts about the financial crisis of 2008, before we use 
literature of general firm performance during recessions, as well as some literature on 
competitive advantages becoming more unstable and less sustainable, to formulate some 
hypotheses of what might happen to the competitive advantages of firms during recessions. 
Literature on how different firm characteristics might affect firm performance will also be 
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presented as this gives an indication of what effect the same firm characteristics might have 
on competitive advantages.  
 
3.2 The impact of the financial crisis of 2008 
The first clear signs of a financial crisis became current in 2007, but it was in September 2008 
that the crisis hit the economy hard. The financial crisis of 2008 affected large parts of the real 
economy. Demand from both households and businesses were reduced and foreign trade 
declined, causing production to fall. The demand for labor declined and the unemployment 
rate in most countries increased significantly (Statistics Norway, 2009; Brealey et al., 2012). 
At the same time, corporate profitability was severely weakened and the number of 
bankruptcies increased (Brealey et al., 2012). This intensified the problems that had occurred 
in the financial markets. When businesses and individuals went bankrupt, it led to large losses 
in the financial sector. There was an increasing distrust between banks and other financial 
institutions, which led to more tightened lending policies. This again led to reduced corporate 
investments, household purchases and general consumption. In other words, the weak real 
economy and the crisis in the financial markets reinforced each other (Statistics Norway, 
2009). 
 
The origin of the financial crisis of 2008 was the United States of America, but it quickly 
spread worldwide. Especially European countries were severely affected by the crisis, and it 
hit Norway as an exogenous demand shock through reductions in aggregate demand for large 
parts of the economy. However, the Norwegian economy fared relatively well through the 
financial crisis of 2008 compared to other countries (Statistics Norway, 2010). Norway had 
active fiscal, monetary and credit policies which gave significant contributions to the 
limitation of the economic downturn that most countries experienced during the crisis, and in 
addition, the Norwegian government took fast and comprehensive action in order to stabilize 
the Norwegian markets and to improve access to new loans to Norwegian financial 
institutions (Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2009). Norway also has a relatively large public 
sector which grew during the crisis, and this also contributed to the GDP decline in Norway 
being smaller than in most European countries (Statistics Norway, 2010). Even though the 
Norwegian economy was hit less severely than its European counterparts, the crisis was by no 
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means negligible in Norway. Several industries experienced declines in sales revenue and 
profitability. The Norwegian economy was also indirectly hit because so many of the 
country’s foreign trade partners were severely hit by the crisis.  
 
3.3 Sustainable competitive advantage 
Due to the proximity to the financial crisis of 2008, this study does not examine the 
sustainability of competitive advantages, but rather the short-term stability. Nevertheless, we 
consider it necessary to illuminate the concept of sustainability because it is the motive of this 
thesis. In addition, it can contribute to the understanding that long-lasting stability can be 
defined as sustainability. The term “sustainable competitive advantage” has been subject of 
considerable debate. The discussion is especially concerned with whether competitive 
advantages have become more short-term and unstable. D’Aveni et al. (2010) is an important 
contributor to this discussion, pointing out recent studies suggesting that sustainable 
competitive advantages are rare and declining in duration. Thomas and D’Aveni (2009) found 
that the volatility of financial performance has increased over time. This suggests that the 
relative importance of the temporary component of competitive advantage is rising, compared 
to the long run component of sustainable competitive advantage. Wiggins & Ruefli (2002) 
have studied the incidence and persistence of superior economic performance by analyzing a 
sample of 6,772 firms in 40 industries over 25 years, and they found interesting results. While 
some firms exhibit superior economic performance, only a very small minority does so, and 
the phenomenon rarely persists through long time frames. They found two types of firms that 
are more likely to achieve persistent superior economic performance; smaller firms with large 
market shares in relatively small (and possibly young) industries, and larger firms with lower 
levels of diversification. The key finding of this research is that the demonstrated rarity of 
achieving sustained superior economic performance proves that it is very difficult to attain. 
This in turn implies that superior economic performance can only be achieved by skillfully 
implemented and adapted strategies over long periods of time.  
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3.4 Competitive advantage during recessions 
3.4.1 Firm performance during recessions 
Preconditions for using recessions as exogenous shocks to an economy are that they have a 
considerable effect on firm performance, and that they are largely unanticipated. Because the 
literature on competitive advantage during crisis is so limited, it is useful to include literature 
about firm performance during recessions. How firms perform during crisis can give us some 
indications of what will happen to the firms’ competitive advantages.  
 
Geroski and Gregg (1996, 1997) studied the effects of recessions on firm performance by 
analyzing the distribution of profit margins for about 2,300 large UK companies during the 
period of 1971-93. The findings were interesting. Firstly, they found that the average profit 
margins varied procyclically, even though there was no clear trend. Secondly, they found that 
there was a significant rise in the standard deviation of profit margins during recessions, and 
that the dispersion did not return to pre-recession levels after the recession was over. Finally, 
they found that the spread of margins across firms was greater than the variation in median 
and mean margins over time, and that margins for firms within the lower quartile of the 
sample fell further than the margins of the firms in the top quartile. Geroski and Gregg 
explained these findings with a relatively small percentage of firms had profits falling 
relatively heavily. These arguments are also supported by their findings that the bottom 
quartile of firms also had the largest reductions in sale.  
 
Geroski and Gregg (1997) found no statistically significant relationship between pre-recession 
profits and how severely firms were affected by the recession. Knudsen (2011) has studied the 
effect of different pre-recession characteristics on the severity of recession impact on 
Norwegian firms. He complemented secondary financial data with primary data from an 
extensive questionnaire about the effects of the financial crisis of 2008 distributed to 5000 
Norwegian companies in late 2010, and found out why some firms are more severely affected 
by recessions than others, and how different firm and industry characteristics affect firms’ 
vulnerability to shocks. His first finding is that firms with high operating profits prior to the 
recession are less vulnerable to the recession than firms with low pre-recession operating 
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profits. This coincides with earlier empirical findings of the survival of more profitable firms, 
while the least profitable firms are forced out of business during recessions (Aw et al., 2001; 
Baily et al., 1992; Bellone et al., 2008; Carreira & Teixeira, 2011; Griliches & Regev, 1995), 
and the classical selection argument stating that the least productive firms leave the market 
while the most productive ones survive (Alchian, 1950; Friedman, 1953). The findings are 
however in conflict with the findings of Nishimura et al. (2005), who found that efficient 
firms exited the market while the inefficient ones survived. The poorly functioning Japanese 
banking system is suggested as the reason for these findings. 
 
3.4.2 Effects of firm characteristics: Firm size 
An interesting feature is the link between competitive advantage and firm size. Because large 
firms have easier access to resources and are more able to achieve economies of scale, one 
assumes that larger firms are more competitive than small firms. Moen (1999) argues that this 
is the case because small companies have less purchasing power and produce lower quantities 
than large companies, making it difficult to get input factors at a low price and to obtain 
economies of scale. However, small companies are able to develop competitive advantages - 
usually by having unique products or technology (Moen, 1999). There is an ongoing 
discussion concerning the causal direction of the relationship between firm size and 
efficiency. It can be difficult to determine whether the firm is efficient because it is large, or if 
a firm is large because it is efficient. In support of the first direction is the fact that large firms 
achieve economies of scale and have easier access to resources and finance, while the other 
direction could be explained by efficient companies buying less efficient companies and 
thereby expand. The most important implication of the latter direction is that the efficient 
firms capture market shares and input factors from the less efficient firms through the market 
for corporate control. 
 
There have been done some studies of the effect of firm size on profitability during 
recessions. Geroski and Gregg (1997) find that smaller firms are more affected by recessions 
than larger firms, and these findings are supported by several other studies (Gertler & 
Gilchrist, 1994; Lang & Nakamura, 1995). This is explained by the economies of scale and 
easier access to external finance and other resources that larger firms enjoy. Knudsen (2011) 
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on the other hand, finds that firm size is in fact positively related to the probability of a firm 
being severely affected by a recession. He found that the largest firms was more severely hit 
by the financial crisis of 2008 than small firms, and explains this with smaller firms being 
more flexible than larger firms. When demand is dropping rapidly, it is an advantage to be 
able to adjust business accordingly. Large firms tend to be more rigid and less flexible than 
smaller firms, and this indicates that larger firms are more severely affected by recessions. 
Another factor that coincides with the prediction of larger firms being more severely hit than 
smaller firms, is the nature of the product the firms sell. Firms that are producing durable 
goods are likely to experience a steeper decline in demand, because consumers are more 
cautious with respect to buying such products during times of recession. Durable goods are 
often produced by manufacturing firms that are large in size, and this contributes to the 
assumption that larger firms are hit harder by recessions than small firms. 
 
Level of exports is yet another decisive factor regarding firm size and recessions. If a 
recession hits several countries in different parts of the world, firms that depend on 
international trade will suffer. Large firms tend to have a larger share of exports, which can be 
decisive as to how the firm manages throughout the recession. During a worldwide crisis like 
the financial crisis of 2008, it is reasonable to assume that larger firms are more severely hit 
than small firms when we look at the level of exports. However, it is important to notice that 
the type of effect depends on the nature of the crisis. While the financial crisis of 2008 had an 
international impact which affected export intensive firms negatively, this does not apply to 
all recessions. For example, during the Norwegian banking crisis of the late 1980’s, it was the 
firms that mainly traded domestically which suffered the most. Between the large share of 
durable goods and high levels of export, large firms risk meeting a double negative effect on 
demand during recessions.  
 
3.4.3 Effects of firm characteristics: Financial leverage 
Capital structure is another feature that can explain differences in how firms are affected by 
recessions. The relationship between capital structure and performance during recessions has 
been examined by several studies, and most of them find evidence of capital structure 
affecting the performance of firms during recessions. This is in contrast to Miller and 
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Modigliani’s (1958) first proposition, which states that the value of a firm is unaffected by its 
choice of capital structure.  
 
In their study of 2,300 large UK firms during the period of 1971-93, Geroski and Gregg 
(1996) found that highly leveraged firms were more severely affected by the 1991-92 
recession than firms with lower debt ratios. Opler and Titman (1994) studied the income 
statement and balance sheet items of 46,799 publicly traded firms in the period of 1972-91, 
and found that highly leveraged firms were more severely affected by recessions than less 
leveraged firms. More specifically, they found that the sales of firms in the top leverage decile 
declined by 26 percent more than for the firms in the bottom leverage decile. This is explained 
by financial distress being costly, and particularly the indirect costs were found to be 
significant. Because financial distress is so costly, it is reasonable to assume that the highly 
leveraged firms will experience more difficulties during recessions than less leveraged firms. 
The findings of Campello and Fluck (2006) were similar. Using detailed firm- and industry-
level data from 57 U.S. manufacturing companies over the 1990-91 recession, they found that 
firms with high debt levels lost more market shares, and experienced higher drops in 
operating profits during economic downturns than less leveraged firms. Knudsen (2011) 
complemented secondary financial data with primary data from an extensive questionnaire 
about the effects of the financial crisis of 2008, distributed to 5000 Norwegian companies in 
late 2010. This study also found that firms with high pre-recession debt-ratio were more 
vulnerable to recessions than their counterparts with lower debt levels. To sum it up, the 
literature is clear and unambiguous regarding the fact that firms with high leverage will be 
more severely hit by a crisis than firms with low debt ratios.  
 
3.4.4 Effects of firm characteristics: Growth rate 
Pre-recession growth rate is another interesting feature that may have an impact on firm 
performance during recession. Geroski and Gregg (1996) found that firms which experienced 
unusually high growth rates prior to the recession often proved to be particularly vulnerable to 
recessionary pressure. Lien (2010) came to the same conclusion – he explains that companies 
experiencing high growth late in a boom have a large share of marginal customers. These are 
people or firms which will begin to demand the firm’s products only in the peak of the boom. 
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More customers than usual feel that they can afford certain products when times are good, but 
they will instantly restrict consumption when a crisis hits. Firms with a large share of this type 
of customers will experience a sudden drop in demand when crisis hits, which is higher than 
the decline in demand for firms that did not experience the same high growth prior to the 
recession. Knudsen’s (2011) findings coincide with this; he found that high pre-recession 
growth increased the probability that a firm would be severely affected by the recession. In 
another study of Geroski and Gregg (1997), they found that firms that grew rapidly during 
early stages of the recession proved less vulnerable to the recession than others. Higson et al. 
(2004) found similar results. They studied 43,612 UK companies over the period of 1967-97, 
and found that the effects of aggregate shocks are more pronounced for firms in the middle 
range of growth. Rapidly growing and rapidly declining firms were found to be less sensitive 
to aggregate shocks than firms in the interior of the growth range. They explain that the fastest 
growers in a recovery are less responsive to macroeconomic conditions than firms with lower 
growth rates, because rapid growers are overstretched and have enough slack to meet the 
higher demand that recovery brings. The study stresses the fact that some firms can 
experience a rapid growth even in recessions, while other firms will decline even in 
recoveries. This highlights that firms’ profitability and growth during recessions is an 
extensive and complex subject. Because growth rates are non-linear and complex variables, it 
would be valuable to examine the effects on firm performance during crisis from different 
angles. However, it is important to note that the five studies presented here investigate growth 
rates in different stages of the business cycle. This means that these studies are not directly 
comparable, but we believe that they can implicate what effect growth rates have on firms’ 
competitive advantages and give grounds for hypotheses. 
 
3.5 Summary 
Based on the studies reviewed above, one can conclude that there are several gaps to fill in the 
strategic management field on how recessions affect firms’ competitive advantages. A large 
majority of related findings are byproducts of research related to finance and 
macroeconomics. What we have considered relevant, and thus included in our literature 
review, is research on the financial crisis of 2008, the sustainability of competitive 
advantages, firm performance during recessions and different effects of firm characteristics 
like size, leverage and growth. The research presented will be the basis for our hypotheses in 
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chapter five, and we believe that our analyses will add valuable insights and fill some of the 
gaps in the literature. 
 
4. Research design, methodological choices and validity concerns 
4.1 Research design 
Saunders et al. (2009) describe research design as the overall plan and structure for how to 
answer the research question, i.e. the chosen framework used to collect, analyze and interpret 
the data. To develop a research design first involves determining whether the study has an 
exploratory, descriptive or explanatory design. Exploratory studies have the purpose to assess 
phenomena in a new light, to ask questions and to seek new insights into the phenomena. 
Descriptive studies aim to produce an accurate representation of persons, events or situations, 
but in order to go further and draw conclusions from the data one is describing, there is a need 
to evaluate data and synthesize ideas. Explanatory studies, which focus on studying a situation 
or a problem in order to explain the relationship between variables, do just that. In addition, 
one could often go ahead and subject the data to statistical tests such as a correlation analysis. 
Our study utilizes both description and explanation, where description functions as a 
forerunner to the latter. Therefore we say that we have a descripto-explanatory study. 
 
The literature that will provide the foundation on which the research is built can be 
approached in two different ways; with either an inductive or a deductive approach (Saunders 
et al., 2009). An inductive approach involves developing theory as a result of observing 
empirical data, and later relating it to existing literature. A deductive approach involves using 
literature to identify theories and hypotheses that will be tested using data, and the objective is 
to be able to generalize the results. In addition, the researcher should be independent of what 
is observed. This study has a deductive approach as we develop a theoretical framework, after 
which we subsequently test several hypotheses using data. The concept of competitive 
advantage will be operationalized in a way that enables it to be measured quantitatively. 
Further, we will compare our results to the existing literature, and finally draw conclusions 
which will answer the research question. The study is thus highly structured.  
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Saunders et al. (2009) further present the classical experimental design, the case design and 
the survey design as the three most usual research designs. The experimental design uses one 
experimental group and one control group, leaving the experimenter in control of all variables 
in the research model, while the case design investigates a particular contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context. The survey design contains analysis and comparisons 
of large amounts of data collected from a sizable population. This design is perhaps the most 
common research design in business and management research, and is well suited for 
exploratory- and descriptive studies. The survey design is chosen for this thesis because of the 
purpose and goal of the study, and because the large amounts of data used in this type of study 
make it possible to generate representative findings. Further, a study can be based on primary 
data and/or secondary data. Primary data is data collected specifically for the research project 
being undertaken, while secondary data is data that was originally collected for some other 
purpose. In this study, secondary financial data is used, and hence a quantitative method is 
chosen. 
 
4.2 Data collection 
Data will be collected from SNF (Institute for Research in Economics and Business 
Administration) and NHH’s database for accounting- and firm information for Norwegian 
companies. The latter database consists of accounting information for all Norwegian firms for 
the years of 1992-2010, and is delivered to SNF from the Brønnøysund Register Centre via 
Dun & Bradstreet Norway AS in cooperation with Menon Business Economics AS (Mjøs & 
Øksnes, 2009). The Brønnøysund Register Centre is a government administrative agency 
responsible for a number of national regulatory and registration schemes for business and 
industry. The database also consists of other information like industry classification codes 
(NACE), industry groups, company forms and other useful information. Mjøs and Øksnes 
(2009) present an extensive review of the database with detailed descriptions of the included 
variables, as well as overviews of the number of observations per variable. 
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4.3 Reliability and validity concerns  
In order to judge the quality of the study, the validity and reliability of the study must be 
assessed. Validity is the extent to which the data collection method accurately measures what 
it was intended to measure, and the extent to which research findings are really about what 
they profess to be about (Saunders et al., 2009). There are two types of validity that are 
important to consider; internal and external validity. Internal validity focuses on whether 
findings and conclusions are tenable and correct. Accordingly, it refers to whether the 
conclusions one has drawn coincide with reality or not. In order for this to be redeemed, it is 
important to have a representative sample. Generally, the validity of quantitative studies is 
relatively good. This applies to our study through the fact that our secondary financial data 
provide us with the information that we need to answer our research question. To illustrate, 
our dataset contains operating profit margins as well as revenues and assets, which we need to 
further investigate profitability and competitive advantages. On the other hand, the validity is 
decreased by account of two different issues. First, we have the fact that firms may have 
reported manipulated or inaccurate data in their accountancy, and we do not have the 
opportunity or the time to examine this and eventually correct it. Second, similar inaccuracies 
may arise due to us excluding some firms ahead of the analysis. These matters can be a 
potential source of bias that we have to take into consideration when we draw our 
conclusions. 
  
External validity indicates to which degree we can generalize the results, i.e. to which degree 
the results can be transferred to other samples and situations. Since we analyze a large number 
of firms, we should have very few problems generalizing our findings. However, one problem 
could be related to the fact that Norwegian firms may tend to act in other ways than foreign 
firms when facing an economic crisis, in addition to economic crises being different in both 
nature and impact. Also, due to our sampling criteria, a large number of companies are 
removed from the sample. This may lead to sample biases which can influence the results 
negatively. These factors must be considered when generalizing the results in order to use 
them in other situations and samples. 
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Reliability assesses the degree to which the data collection methods and -analyses will be 
trustworthy and yield consistent findings. To address this issue one can ask three questions: 1) 
Will the measures yield the same results on other occasions? 2) Will similar observations be 
reached by other observers? and 3) Is there transparency in how sense was made from the raw 
data? (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). Further, Robson (2002) suggests four different threats to 
reliability. These are concern biases and errors related to the participant or the subject, and 
errors and biases related to the observer. The problems are relevant mostly in qualitative 
studies where there can be several observers who conduct the research while not asking the 
questions in the same way, and who later interpret the research differently. They may be 
asking different participants at different points in time and these participants might interpret 
the questions differently, or not answer them honestly. However, since our study is 
quantitative, transparent and well structured, reliability should not be subject to biases or 
errors. 
 
4.4 Sampling strategy 
4.4.1 Empirical setting 
The aim of this study is to give an as accurate as possible picture of the stability of 
competitive advantages of Norwegian firms during the financial crisis of 2008, and to draw 
conclusions from it. In order to achieve this, as many firms as possible should be included in 
the chosen empirical setting. This will increase the external validity of the findings. However, 
in order to make the sample as representative as possible for Norwegian firms, we have found 
it necessary to exclude some firms from the sample. By excluding firms that may cause 
inaccuracies, the internal validity of the findings increases. Even after excluding those firms, 
the sample is still very large, and since it is cross-sectional, the external validity will still be 
satisfying.  
 
4.4.2 Sample size 
The chosen sample frame of this study is the whole population of Norwegian firms. In 2010, 
the whole sample frame consisted of 240,758 different firms. Due to the very large size of the 
sample frame, it is impossible to sort out individual cases that may cause inaccuracies in the 
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findings. To decide which firms that should be included in the sample and which firms that 
should be excluded, we have generated cut-off limits for some of the variables in the sample. 
In this section, we will explain and justify the choices we have made with regards to the 
sampling for analyzing the secondary financial data we have collected.  
 
Sample criteria 1: Remove firms with missing information 
To create a complete dataset, containing both the accounting information and the industry- 
and company information that we needed for the analysis, we had to merge together two 
different datasets for each year. The two datasets are mostly consistent, but the number of 
observations is somewhat different in some of the years. Possible explanations for the lack of 
information are that new firms start up, or that existing firms go bankrupt. During a crisis, 
more firms than usual go out of business, which indicates that the sample will contain more 
firms with missing information these years. There is a risk that the analyses suffer from 
survivorship bias, i.e. that the results would be skewed because only the companies that are 
successful enough to survive until the end are included. However, we believe that this will not 
affect the analyses negatively. In fact, the sample becomes more conservative, which reduces 
the chance of observing exaggerated effects. As the firms with missing accounting values 
would be excluded from the dataset because of our other sample criteria, we chose not to 
exclude any firms with missing accounting values at this stage. Firms with missing company- 
and industry information, but containing accounting information, would be possible to include 
in the analyses, so we chose not to exclude these firms either.  
 
Sample criteria 2: Years 1999-2010 
The dataset originally consists of financial data for all Norwegian firms in the period 1992-
2010. To make the study as comprehensive and consistent as possible, it would be preferable 
to include all the years available in the dataset. However, changed accounting practices in 
Norway from 01.01.1999 make this difficult. To ensure that the dataset is as consistent as 
possible, only information from the years 1999-2010 will be included in the sample. We 
believe this eleven-year period is sufficient to explore the impact of the financial crisis on the 
short-term stability of firms’ competitive advantages. 
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Sample criteria 3: Include only AS, ASA, ANS and DA firms 
Detailed information about the legal form of the firms is included in the dataset. In all, there 
are 42 different legal forms included in the dataset, many of which are not relevant for this 
study. We have therefore chosen to include only four different types of firms in our sample. 
The legal forms we are including are “joint-stock companies” (AS), “publicly traded 
companies” (ASA), “responsible corporations” (ANS) and “companies with apportioned 
liability” (DA). It was also considered to include Norwegian companies registered abroad 
(NUF), but due to the large amount of small companies using this legal form to save taxes, 
and as a cheap substitute for establishing an AS, we decided to exclude these. In addition, the 
dataset is rather incomplete with regards to such firms. Foundation (STI) is a legal form 
which includes a relatively large number of companies. However, these are excluded from the 
sample because they often are established for non-commercial purposes. 
 
By excluding all legal forms other than AS, ASA, ANS and DA, many unwanted company 
forms are removed from the sample. At the same time the sample rate remains very high, 
because these four legal forms constitute a very large part of all firms in Norway. More 
specifically, in 2010, the sample consists of 205,379 firms after excluding all other legal 
forms than AS, ASA, ANS and DA. This represents 85.3 percent of all companies in the 
dataset.  
 
Sample criteria 4: Exclude government owned firms 
The firms in the dataset are divided into ten different ownership structures. Government 
owned companies will be excluded from the sample because such firms are not necessarily 
profit maximizing. When these companies are removed, the sample in 2010 consists of 
202,644 firms. This is equivalent to 84.2 percent of the total dataset. The dataset is however 
somewhat incomplete with regards to the information about ownership structure. For the years 
of 2000-2002, the dataset does not include any information about the ownership structure of 
the firms. This makes it impossible to exclude the government owned companies from the 
dataset for these years. As the main focus of this study is to analyze the financial crisis of 
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2008, the variable is included as a sample criterion even though there are missing 
observations in the years 2000-2002.  
 
Sample criteria 5: Sales income >= 10.0 MNOK 
In order to exclude very small companies, as well as holding companies and other firms with 
very little or no income, firms with sales income lower than 10.0 MNOK is excluded. There is 
a large number of very small companies in Norway, and including all of these in the analysis 
would affect the results. Since we are adjusting the industry on a regular mean, the sample 
would be dominated by the very small companies. Equally important is the fact that our study 
is part of a larger research program, and will be used to complement other research projects at 
NHH. Thus, our analysis must be done within the same criteria as the other projects in the 
research program. We are using 2007 as a basis year for the 10.0 MNOK and adjust the cut-
off limit according to inflation by using the consumer price index (CPI) for all the other years 
(appendix A). In the same way as for sample criteria 1, removing firms with sales income 
lower than 10.0 MNOK can cause survivorship bias. Firms that end up just below the limit 
will be removed from the sample, and this can lead to skewed results. However, we believe 
that this will contribute to more conservative results, which reduce the chance of observing 
exaggerated effects. 
 
Sample criteria 6: Labor costs and social expenses >= 3.0 MNOK 
In order to exclude holding companies and property companies, a cut-off on labor costs and 
social expenses will be set. The most preferable would be to set the cut-off based on the 
number of employees, but this is not possible due to incomplete reports of this variable in the 
dataset. Labor costs and social expenses are indirect measures of the number of employees, as 
companies with few employees will have low labor costs and social expenses. Companies 
with such costs lower than 3.0 MNOK are excluded from the sample. This sum is chosen in 
order for the sample to have the same criteria as other complimentary research projects at 
NHH. The 3.0 MNOK is in 2007-kroner, and is adjusted according to CPI for the other years 
to ensure that the samples are comparable (appendix A). 
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Sample criteria 7: Remove agricultural industries, finance and insurance, health industries 
and cultural industries.  
There are some industries which would be suitable to exclude from the sample. We argue that 
it is desirable for the companies in the sample to be as “ordinary” as possible, in the way that 
they are competitive and profit maximizing, and that they have income statements and 
balance sheets that are easy to compare. Therefore, industries characterized by subsidies or 
tariff barriers, industries in close relation to the government and industries with special 
accounting standards will be excluded from the sample. These are mainly agriculture, finance 
and insurance, health and culture.  There are different reasons for why these industries do not 
have a normal market mechanism. Norwegian agriculture is in large parts funded by 
subsidies; health industries are mainly run or controlled by the government; culture industries 
are somewhat connected to the state and financed by a combination of subsidies and volunteer 
work; and finance and insurance industries operate with different accounting treatment of 
revenues and profits than most other industries, and would thus be difficult to compare to the 
rest of the sample. Another note with regards to removing the industries of finance and 
insurance is that we wish to examine what effect the financial crisis had on non-financial 
industries. By including these industries, they would in large parts overshadow other 
interesting results. The financial aspect of the crisis will however indirectly be included, 
because leverage will be a focus area in the analysis. The industries with two-digit NACE-
codes of 1, 2, 40, 65, 66, 67, 75, 80, 85, 90, 91, 92 and 99 (appendix B) will be removed from 
the dataset. This is also in accordance with the other research projects in the research program 
to which our thesis contributes. 
 
Sample criteria 8: Exclude extreme observations based on standard deviations 
After the first seven sample criteria are conducted, we will do some analyses without 
changing the sample any further. We will conduct descriptive analyses of profitability mean, 
median and standard deviation each year. This will be done for operating profit margin, ROA 
and sales growth (hypothesis 1, 2 and 3). When these analyses are taken one step further by 
exploring the top and bottom decile for operating profit margin and ROA, this sample 
criterion is conducted. Throughout the rest of the study, we will use mean to compute the 
competitive advantage variables. Mean can be a more vulnerable measure than median 
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because it is affected by a few very large or very small values which will be reflected in a 
skewed mean. Nevertheless, we choose to use mean instead of median because competitive 
advantage is defined by better returns than the industry mean. 
 
The dataset includes firms that in different years have extreme observations. This may be due 
to various reasons; it may be random situations or special circumstances for specific 
companies. When using mean, these observations can interfere with the analysis, and thus 
affect the results. Extreme values will therefore be excluded from the sample for later 
analyses. This is done by only including companies with measurement variables within the 
range of +/- two standard deviations from the mean. The exclusion will be done for the 
variables operating profit margin and ROA. This operation is not done for growth rates, 
because this variable will not be used further in the analysis. We will then compute the 
competitive advantage variables and use them in the rest of the analyses. The sample size 
before and after the removal of outliers, is shown in a table in the summary paragraph below. 
 
Summary 
By using the eight sample criteria outlined above, the samples in the table on the next page 
were constructed for the years of 1999-2010. The rows Ndrmarg, NROA and Ngrowth show the 
number of firms in the sample after criteria 1 through 7 have been conducted, i.e. sample with 
outliers. The rows Ndrmarg* and NROA* show the number of firms in the sample after criteria 1 
through 8 have been conducted, i.e. sample without outliers. As mentioned, this is not done 
for the growth variable because this variable is not used further in the analysis. 
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Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Ndrmarg 13350 13770 14130 14382 13731 14479 15678 16762 18908 18131 17616 16719 
NROA 13347 13769 14130 14382 13730 14477 15676 16762 18908 18131 16719 16719 
Ngrowth* ** 11486 11768 12146 11975 12962 12962 14083 15963 15593 15210 15210 
Ndrmarg* 13188 13722 13964 14132 13576 14146 15442 16139 18735 18109 17356 16299 
NROA* 13323 13572 13969 14237 13727 14471 15480 16481 18564 18129 16701 16701 
**Since the data from 1998 is not used in this analysis, there is no sales growth rate in 1999. 
 
Despite the fact that a large proportion of the dataset is excluded from the sample, the sample 
sizes are still large. This is important for the analysis to generate results that can be 
generalized to the population, as well as securing that the analysis is as robust as possible 
(Saunders et al., 2009). We would like to stress that these selection criteria are set based on 
two factors; our own judgment of what will be the most suitable for us to answer our research 
question, as well as guidelines given to us by the research project that this study is a part of.  
 
4.5 Data analysis 
The SNF data files are large, and we will use the statistical software program SPSS to carry 
out our analyses. Our descripto-explanatory analysis will consist of various correlation 
analyses where the motive is to test our hypotheses and possibly reveal the stability of firms’ 
competitive advantages. Correlation results will tell us something about how stable the 
competitive advantages are during crisis and which firm- and industry characteristics that can 
affect this stability. The way in which we are going to interpret the correlation results will be 
explained later on. The variables we choose are either already in the SNF files or easily 
computed prior to the analysis. Our results will be handled and presented in Windows Office 
Excel. 
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A preliminary step will be to determine which type of correlation analysis is the most 
appropriate. In the case where the data is normally distributed, the most instinctive type of 
choice will be the Pearson’s correlation analysis, while a non-normal distribution of the data 
indicates the use of Spearman’s rho as the suitable analysis. Our preparatory normality test 
showed that in the majority of the data sets the data was not normally distributed, and the 
proper test would therefore be Spearman’s rho (appendix C). This test describes a non-linear 
relationship, and the correlation coefficient in a Spearman analysis can be between -1 and 1, 
i.e. positive or negative. We will not be able to conclude in cases where the results are not 
statistically significant. 
 
Statistical significance means that it is unlikely that the result occurred by chance. The 
concept of significance in statistical correlation does not necessarily denote that something is 
important, as it may do in other contexts. It only signifies that something is probably not 
accidental. Statistical significance is a central concept in hypothesis testing. We operate our 
study with 99- and 95 percent confidence interval, but have chosen not to specifically 
distinguish between them in the presentation of the analysis. As long as the significance stays 
within a 95 percent confidence interval or higher, we will include the correlation coefficient in 
our results. Significance within a 99- and 95 percent confidence interval means that the 
probability of true value is 0.99 and 0.95, respectively. In other words, high significance 
indicates reliable results.  
 
The final step of our analysis will be to interpret and explain the results. In order to do this, it 
will be decisive to understand the meaning of the correlation coefficient, and how it can help 
us draw conclusions. Generally explained, a Spearman correlation coefficient different from 
zero tells us how well the relationship between two variables can be described. The sign of the 
Spearman correlation coefficient tells us the direction of the relationship between X (the 
independent variable) and Y (the dependent variable). If Y increases when X increases, the 
Spearman correlation coefficient is positive. If Y declines when X increases, the Spearman 
correlation coefficient is negative. The Spearman correlation coefficient increases in 
magnitude as X and Y become closer to being perfect functions of each other.  
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In our study, the meaning of the Spearman correlation coefficient will be interpreted as 
follows: A positive correlation coefficient means that the firms which perform poorly one 
year perform poorly the next year, or that those which perform well one year perform well the 
next year; hence, more stable competitive advantages. A positive but lower correlation 
coefficient from one year to another indicates a lower probability of performing accordingly; 
hence, less stable competitive advantages. A negative correlation coefficient means that the 
firms which perform well/poorly one year perform, poorly/well the next year, respectively. 
 
4.5.1 Variables 
In order to answer our research question, we need to identify variables which can describe 
firm performance, or more exact, a firm’s competitive advantage. The competitive advantage 
variable is defined by two different profitability measures, and we will describe them in the 
following. 
 
Profitability measures and measures of competitive advantage 
There are two types of profits that can be used to describe the profitability of a firm: 
accounting profits and economic profits. What distinguishes the one from the other is the 
presence of opportunity costs in the economic profits. It is difficult to collect information 
about opportunity costs in real life settings, and most researchers use accounting profits 
because of the availability and easy access to firms’ accounting statements. This also applies 
to our situation, and all of our numbers will therefore be accountancy based. To support our 
choice, Lipczynski et al. (2005) found that accounting rates of return can be a useful indicator, 
even if it is not the absolute perfect one. 
 
As mentioned earlier, we define competitive advantage as profitability above the industry 
mean. We will use operating profit margin (drmarg) and return on assets (ROA) as measures 
of profitability for each company, because the use of both will give us a complete overall 
picture. ROA takes into account the firm’s assets, while operating profit margin focuses on 
the operation of the firm independent of the balance sheet. The use of the two will therefore 
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make us able to conclude on a broader scale, which will result in our findings being more 
robust. Finally, we will compute the variables into two competitive advantage variables (CA) 
by subtracting the industry mean (by 2-digit NACE code, 2002 revision. Appendix B). We 
present the formula for the calculation of the competitive advantage variable: 
 
                                                                        
 
It is important to remember that this variable implies both competitive advantages and 
disadvantages, i.e. that it may be both positive and negative. In accordance with the definition 
of competitive advantage, a firm has a competitive disadvantage if it has lower profitability 
than the industry mean. As we pointed out in chapter 1.3, this thesis investigates the stability 
of both competitive advantages and disadvantages, but we will refer to both of these as 
competitive advantage.  
 
While the operating profit margin variable can be found directly in the SNF files, we will 
compute ROA by dividing net income by total assets: 
    
          
            
 
 
4.5.2 Splits 
The two main variables, competitive advantage based on operating profit margin and 
competitive advantage based on ROA, will constitute the basis for the correlation analysis. 
We will investigate the competitive advantage variables with both 1-year and 2-year 
correlation analyses in SPSS, and we will perform the analyses for the entire samle in addition 
to various splits. The reason for the splits is to investigate if firm characteristics affect the 
performance of the firms during crisis. We will split the files on firm size, leverage and 
growth.  
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Size 
When we perform the splits on firm size we use total sales revenue. 
 
Leverage 
Firm debt ratio is the last variable we have to compute, and we do this by subtracting the 
firms’ equity ratio from 1: 
                          
The equity ratio is computed in the SNF data files as: 
             
      
             
 
 
Growth 
In order to split the results on growth, we compute the following variable: 
                      
           
 
‘Salgsinn’ stands for total sales revenue, and t denotes the specific year. This growth 
calculation gives us the growth from the previous year to the current; i.e that the growth rate 
in 2007 means the growth that took place from 2006 to 2007.  
 
The splits will be divided into ten percentiles each for size, leverage and growth. We will 
correlate the competitive advantage variable of firms over 1- and 2-years within the same 
percentile. 
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5. Hypotheses 
5.1 Introduction 
In this section we will present some hypotheses that can enlighten our main research question; 
how a crisis will affect the short-term stability of the relative performance between firms 
during crisis. First, there will be a few hypotheses regarding the impact of the financial crisis 
of 2008 on firm performance, before several hypotheses regarding the short-term stability of 
competitive advantages during recessions are presented. These will also shed light on the 
effect of different firm characteristics. 
 
5.2 Firm performance during the financial crisis of 2008 
The financial crisis of 2008 affected large parts of the economy. Demand from both 
households and businesses were reduced and foreign trade declined, causing production to 
decrease; the demand for labor declined and the unemployment rate in most countries 
increased significantly (Statistics Norway, 2009; Brealey et al., 2012). In order to explore how 
firm performance was affected by the crisis, we will analyze the performance measures 
throughout the period of 1999-2010. We will analyze profitability by exploring the mean and 
median of the two profitability measures operating profit margin and return on assets, and the 
volatility will be analyzed by exploring the standard deviation of the same variables. Geroski 
and Gregg (1996, 1997) found that average profit margins varied procyclically, and that the 
standard deviation of profit margins increased during recessions. This indicates that the 
corporate profitability declines and that volatility rises during times of recession, and this is 
the basis for our first two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Operating profit margins and return on assets (ROA) declined during the 
financial crisis of 2008 
 
Hypothesis 2: The standard deviation of operating profit margins and ROA increased 
during the financial crisis of 2008. 
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A reduction in demand was one of the main effects of the financial crisis of 2008. It is 
interesting to explore what happened to this variable for Norwegian firms, and an analysis of 
this will give further insight to the impact of the financial crisis on firm performance. Sales 
growth is a measure that can serve as an indicator of reduction in demand. This variable will 
be analyzed in a similar way as operating profit margins and return on assets. The literature 
review pointed out that demand declines during recessions, which is the basis of our next 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Average sales growth declined during the financial crisis of 2008. 
 
It would be interesting to explore what effects the crisis had on firms in different performance 
percentiles of the sample. There exists some literature regarding this. One of Knudsen’s 
(2011) findings is that firms with high operating profits prior to the 2008 financial crisis are 
less vulnerable to the recession than firms with low pre-recession operating profits. This 
coincides with earlier empirical findings of the survival of more profitable firms, while the 
least profitable firms are forced out of business during recessions (Aw et al., 2001; Baily et 
al., 1992; Bellone et al., 2008; Carreira & Teixeira, 2011; Griliches & Regev, 1995), and the 
classical selection argument stating that the least productive firms leave the market, while the 
most productive ones survive (Alchian, 1950; Friedman, 1953). Geroski and Gregg (1996, 
1997) studied the differences between the highest and lowest quartile based on profitability, 
and found that margins fell further for firms within the lower quartile than for firms within the 
top quartile. This indicates that it is the less profitable firms that are the most severely affected 
during recessions, and it is reasonable to assume that this group of firms also experienced a 
larger increase in volatility during the crisis. This gives grounds for the next hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The average performance of the lowest performing firms falls more during 
crisis than the average performance of the highest performing firms 
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Hypothesis 5: The standard deviation of operating profit margins and ROA during crisis is 
higher for the lowest performing firms than for the highest performing firms. 
 
5.3 Competitive advantage during the financial crisis of 2008 
The main purpose of this thesis is to explore how business cycles, and recessions specifically, 
affect the short-term stability of firms’ competitive advantages. It is known that average 
performance declines and the volatility increases during recessions (Geroski & Gregg, 1997), 
but there is no literature about what happens to the relative performance of firms. What 
happens to the competitive advantages during crises? As this is a subject that has not been 
studied, our hypotheses are based on literature on general performance and profitability 
during recessions, as well as what researchers find interesting to examine. Since firm 
profitability decreases and market volatility increases, it is reasonable to assume that it 
becomes more difficult for companies to maintain their competitive advantages during 
recessions. Thus, our hypothesis is that competitive advantages become more unstable during 
times of crisis: 
 
Hypothesis 6: During crisis, firms’ competitive advantages become less stable. 
 
5.4 Effects of firm characteristics on competitive advantage: Firm size 
Moen (1999) explains that there is an expected link between firm size and competitive 
advantage. Knudsen (2011) finds that larger firms are more severely affected by the financial 
crisis of 2008 because they are rigid and less flexible than smaller firms. In addition, since 
large firms are more export intensive and more often produce durable goods, it is reasonable 
to assume that large firms are negatively affected by the financial crisis of 2008. However, the 
results of several other studies contradict Knudsen (Geroski & Gregg, 1997; Gertler & 
Gilchrist, 1994 and Lang & Nakamura, 1995). These studies show that small firms are more 
affected by recessions than larger firms. Due to easier access to resources and external finance 
and better abilities to achieve economies of scale, larger firms are assumed to be more 
competitive than small firms, and thus better equipped to handle a crisis. Other factors such as 
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the nature of the crisis, level of exports, the nature of the product and the composition of 
industries may affect the results. We formulate our next hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 7: During crisis, small firms’ competitive advantages become less stable than 
for large firms. 
 
5.5 Effects of firm characteristics on competitive advantage: Financial 
leverage 
In contrast to Miller and Modigliani’s (1958) theorem stating that the value of a firm is 
unaffected by its choice of capital structure, most studies of the relationship between capital 
structure and performance finds evidence of capital structure affecting the performance of 
firms during recessions. Geroski and Gregg (1993) found that highly leveraged firms were 
more severely affected by the 1991-92 recession than firms with lower debt ratios, while 
Opler and Titman (1994) and Campello and Fluck (2006) found that firms with high debt 
levels lost more market shares, and experienced higher drops in operating profits during 
economic downturns than less leveraged firms. Knudsen (2011) also found that firms with 
high pre-recession debt-ratio were more vulnerable to recessions than their counterparts with 
lower debt levels. The literature is unambiguous in the findings of high-leveraged firms being 
more severely hit by crisis, and this gives ground for the next hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 8: During crisis, high-leveraged firms’ competitive advantages become less 
stable than for low-leveraged firms. 
 
5.6 Effects of firm characteristics on competitive advantage: Growth rates 
Growth rates are complex and non-linear variables. This makes it interesting to explore the 
effect on firms’ competitive advantages from different angles. First, the differences between 
firms with high and firms with low growth rates will be analyzed. Next, differences between 
the firms in the interior of the growth range will be examined up against those with high and 
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low growth rates respectively. This will give a comprehensive insight to the impact of 
different growth rates on firms’ competitive advantages during recessions.  
 
Geroski and Gregg (1996) found that firms which experienced unusually high growth rates 
prior to the recession often proved to be particularly vulnerable to recessionary pressure. Lien 
(2010) found the same – he explains that companies experiencing high growth late in a boom 
will experience a large drop in demand when a crisis hits. This is due to a large share of 
marginal customers. Knudsen’s (2011) findings coincide with this; he found that high pre-
recession growth increased the probability of a firm being severely affected by the recession. 
Nevertheless, firms’ profitability and growth during recessions is an extensive and complex 
subject. Higson et al. (2004) looked at differences between high growth and medium growth 
firms, and found that the effects of aggregate shocks are more pronounced for firms in the 
middle range of growth. Rapidly growing and rapidly declining firms were found to be less 
sensitive to aggregate shocks than firms in the interior of the growth range. However, from 
literature of firm performance during recessions, it is reasonable to assume that firms with low 
growth rates are more severely hit by a crisis than those in the interior range of growth. This is 
because firms with low profitability often have negative growth rates, and that this effect 
probably gets worse when crisis hits (Aw et al., 2001; Baily et al., 1992; Bellone et al., 2008; 
Carreira & Teixeira, 2011; Griliches & Regev, 1995). To sum up, most of the literature finds 
that high-growth firms are experiencing the largest fall in demand for their products during 
early stages of a crisis, while the firms with low growth are severely affected because of their 
poor initial performance. This means that the high-growth firms are more severely affected 
than the medium- and low-growth firms, and that the low growth firms are more severely 
affected than the medium growth firms. This is the basis of our three hypotheses regarding 
growth rates: 
 
Hypothesis 9: During crisis, the competitive advantages of firms with high sales growth 
become less stable than for firms with low sales growth. 
 
 43 
 
Hypothesis 10: During crisis, the competitive advantages of firms with high sales growth 
become less stable than for firms with medium sales growth. 
 
Hypothesis 11: During crisis, the competitive advantages of firms with low sales growth 
become less stable than for firms with medium sales growth. 
 
6. Analysis  
6.1 Introduction 
This section holds all the analyses of our study. We will focus mainly on presenting the 
results, while the next section (chapter 7) will contain our discussion and implications of the 
findings. First, we will present analyses of how the financial crisis of 2008 affected the 
profitability of Norwegian firms. Next, analyses of the financial crisis’ effect on the stability 
of the firms’ competitive advantages will be presented. We will describe the correlations with 
a solidus to illustrate which years have been correlated with each other; e.g. the 1-year 
correlation between the competitive advantage in 2006 and the competitive advantage in 2007 
will be written as 06/07. Finally, we will present analyses on how different firm 
characteristics can contribute to how the competitive advantages and their stability are 
affected during crisis. 
 
6.2 Analyses and hypotheses testing 
6.2.1 Firm performance during the financial crisis of 2008 
Our first hypotheses concern the impact of the financial crisis of 2008 on corporate 
profitability, and will provide insight into how the crisis affected the profitability of 
Norwegian companies. Existing literature (Geroski & Gregg, 1997) predicts that profit 
margins will decline during recessions, and this is the basis for our first hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 1: Operating profit margins (drmarg) and return on assets (ROA) declined 
during the financial crisis of 2008 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1: OPERATING PROFIT MARGINS (DRMARG) FROM 1999 - 2010 (MEAN AND MEDIAN) 
 
 
FIGURE 2: RETURN ON ASSETS (ROA) FROM 1999 - 2010 (MEAN AND MEDIAN) 
 
The graphs have quite different courses. As for the effect of the financial crisis of 2008, both 
graphs show a decline in profitability during this period. The effect is quite severe for both 
operating profit margin and ROA. Operating profit margins experience a significant decline 
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from 2006-2009. The average operating profit margin falls by over 40 percent; from 0.0619 in 
2006 to 0.0365 in 2009. The median follows a year after with a fall from 0.0577 in 2007 to 
0.0406 in 2010; a fall by almost 30 percent. This provides evidence of the financial crisis’ 
negative effect on corporate profitability. The course of the mean and median for operating 
profit margins resemble each other, but the graph shows that the mean has consistently larger 
fluctuations than the median. We see that the curves intersect in 2003 and that the mean is 
larger than the median during the boom, but that the curves intersect again in 2007 when the 
financial crisis first appears, making the mean lower than the median. This is because the 
mean is more vulnerable than the median, and is more affected by those firms that experience 
either very low profitability in recessions or very high profitability in booms than the median.  
 
Return on assets also experiences a decline during the financial crisis of 2008, but the graph 
shows that the effect strikes a year later than for operating profit margins. The mean shows a 
steep, short term effect from 2007-2008; from 0.0979 to 0.0415, which is equivalent to almost 
a 60 percent fall. The median shows a more conservative decline that goes from 0.0973 in 
2007 to 0.0663 in 2009 and 2010. This equals a 32 percent decline. The effect is thus more 
severe for return on assets than for operating profit margins. Both graphs support the 
hypothesis that profitability, based on operating profit margins and return on assets, declined 
during the financial crisis of 2008. 
 
It is interesting to take a closer look at the differences between the mean and the median for 
return on assets. While the median shows quite an even course with a stable growth until 
2007, and then a stable decline from 2007 onwards, the mean shows a rather unstable course 
with significant downturns and peaks. In 2003, the average ROA experiences an extreme fall, 
down to -0.08. This is peculiar because 2003 is a year without any well-known market 
fluctuations. In 2009, there is a large peak in the average ROA which also seems strange, 
since it is so close to the financial crisis of 2008. The fact that the average firm is doing better 
in 2009 than in the boom years of 2005 and 2006 seems peculiar. In order to ensure that it is 
not typing errors or other analytical errors that cause these results, this analysis has been 
conducted twice at different times. The results are the same, which implies that there must be 
other reasons for these results. There might be errors in the dataset, but the most likely 
explanation is that there are some firms that have extraordinary results these years which 
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affect the results. This demonstrates the weakness of using mean as a measure; extreme 
observations will affect the results so that they do not convey an accurate picture of the 
situation for most observations. However, mean is still used to create our main variable (CA) 
throughout the rest of the analyses in this thesis. This is in accordance with the definition of 
competitive advantage, which is based on industry average returns.  In order to reduce the 
possibility that the vulnerability of the mean will affect our analyses, observations that are 
more than +/- two standard deviations from the mean are removed as explained in chapter 
4.4.2. This operation seems to be sufficient. Appendix D consists of graphs that confirm this. 
The graphs show that the mean is no longer affected by extreme observations after outliers +/- 
two standard deviations from the mean are removed. The mean and the median now have 
quite similar courses. This justifies our choice of using mean as the basis for our main 
variable, CA.  
 
During recessions, markets become less secure and predictable. It becomes more difficult for 
firms to maintain their profitability, and because some companies are more severely hit than 
others, there are larger differences in profitability. This will cause an increase in the standard 
deviation of profit margins, which is the basis for our second hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 2: The standard deviation of operating profit margins and ROA increased 
during the financial crisis of 2008. 
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FIGURE 3: STANDARD DEVIAION OF OPERATING PROFIT MARGINS (DRMARG) 1999 – 2010 
 
 
FIGURE 4: STANDARD DEVIATION OF RETURN ON ASSETS (ROA) 1999 - 2010 
 
The graphs show the standard deviation of operating profit margins and return on assets both 
before (blue line) and after (red line) outliers have been removed according to sample criteria 
8. The blue line thus shows the effects for the sample only after sample criteria 1-7 have been 
conducted, while the red line illustrates the effect for the sample used for the further analyses 
in this thesis. We have decided to set the maximum limit of the y-axes to 0.3 for operating 
profit margin and 1.0 for ROA, to emphasize the effects of the crisis when outliers have been 
removed.  If we were to show the entire range of the blue curve, the red curve would look 
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completely flat. We thus observe that the two curves have very different courses, and this is 
due to the extreme observations that affect the analysis before outliers have been removed as 
described above. Before the removal of outliers, the standard deviation of operating profit 
margins experiences an increase in two periods of time; first during the dot-com crisis of 
2000-2001 and again during the financial crisis of 2008. The latter increase is steeper and 
somewhat longer lasting than the first. During the financial crisis of 2008, the standard 
deviation increases from 2006-2008. The increase is rather large, from 0.1316 to 0.9835. This 
is equivalent to a seven-fold increase, and provides clear evidence of markets becoming more 
unpredictable during recessions. Nevertheless, this peak is affected by a few extreme 
observations.  After these outliers have been removed, the standard deviation of operating 
profit margins experiences a rather even course without any prominent peaks or downturns. 
However, like our analysis before removal of outliers, this analysis shows an increase in 
standard deviation during the financial crisis; from 0.075 in 2006 to 0.132 in 2008. This is 
equivalent to a 76 percent increase. In other words, we see that the Norwegian market became 
more volatile during the crisis, also when the extreme observations have been removed.  
 
The standard deviation of return on assets has a similar progress as the one for operating 
profit margins. Before outliers are removed, two periods of time show a large increase in 
standard deviation. This is from 2002-2003 and from 2007-2009. Return on assets thus seems 
to be affected by recessions one year later than operating profit margins are affected. During 
the financial crisis of 2008, the graph shows a steep and significant increase in the standard 
deviation of return on assets, from 0.2475 in 2007 to 10.6648 in 2009; a 43-fold increase. 
However, this effect is caused by a few extreme observations. After these have been removed, 
it becomes clearer what effects the crisis had on the ordinary Norwegian company. The 
numbers show that there is an increase in standard deviation also without outliers; from 0.123 
in 2006 to 0.229 in 2009. This is equivalent to an increase of 86 percent, and it confirms that 
the Norwegian market became more volatile during the financial crisis of 2008. Both graphs 
support our hypothesis of increasing standard deviations of profitability during the financial 
crisis of 2008.  
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An investigation of average sales growth will give a further insight into the effects of the 
financial crisis of 2008. During recessions, demands decline and this will lead to a decline in 
sales growth. This is the basis for our third hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Average sales growth declined during the financial crisis of 2008. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5: SALES GROWTH (VEKST) 1999 - 2010 (MEAN AND MEDIAN) 
 
The graph shows a steady and significant increase in average sales growth from 2003 to 2006. 
This is what we would expect in a boom. From 2006 to 2009, the graph shows a steep and 
significant drop in the average sales growth. From 0.1883 in 2006, it falls down to -0.0083 in 
2009. The median also experiences a steep decline, from 0.097 in 2006 to -0.0263 in 2008. 
This illustrates the effect of the financial crisis on demand, and emphasizes the crisis’ effect 
on corporate performance and profitability. The graph supports the hypothesis of average 
sales growth declining during the financial crisis of 2008.  
 
We want to take a closer look on how different firms are affected by recessions, and more 
specifically if there is a difference in the impact of the 2008 crisis on the 10 percent of the 
firms with the highest average performance, versus the 10 percent with the lowest average 
-0,05
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Sales Growth (vekst) 
Mean Median
 50 
 
performance. The literature review showed that firms with high operating profits prior to the 
recession are less vulnerable to the recession than firms with low pre-recession operating 
profits (Knudsen, 2011; Geroski & Gregg, 1996, 1997). It is reasonable to assume that the 
firms that are more vulnerable to a recession also experience the largest increase in volatility. 
This gave grounds for the next hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 4: The average performance of the lowest performing firms falls more during 
crisis than the average performance of the highest performing firms 
 
Hypothesis 5: The standard deviation of operating profit margins and ROA during crisis is 
higher for the lowest performing firms than for the highest performing firms. 
 
The following analyses are conducted after outliers have been removed in accordance with 
sample criteria 8. The graphs in appendix D show that when outliers have been removed, 
there is little difference between the mean and the median, which affirms that extreme 
observations no longer affect the mean. This justifies our use of mean throughout the rest of 
the study. First, we explore the average operating profit margin: 
 
 
FIGURE 6: AVERAGE OPERATING PROFIT MARGIN - PERCENTILE 1 AND 10 
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We observe that the average operating profit margin of the highest percentile increases prior 
to recessions; both before the dot com crisis of 2000 and the financial crisis of 2008. In 
contrast, the average operating profit margin of the lowest percentile decreases just before and 
during the same two crises. During normal economy levels, the average operating profit 
margin of the high performers stays on a relatively stable level around 0.21. The low-
performing firms fluctuate more, and it seems to be a trend that their average operating profit 
margin increases when it decreases for the high-performers. It also increases steadily in 
normal economy years. As for the financial crisis of 2008, the graph shows that the firms in 
the bottom decile experience a decline from -0.0952 in 2006 to -0.1639 in 2008; a fall of 72 
percent. The firms in the top decile experienced a decline from 0.2699 in 2008 to 0.2202 in 
2010. This is equivalent to 18 percent, and shows that the low-performers experience a more 
severe fall in profitability than the high-performers, which supports our hypothesis. 
 
Next, we analyze the average ROA: 
 
 
FIGURE 7: AVERAGE ROA - PERCENTILE 1 AND 10 
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The average ROA for the 10 percent highest performers stays around a 0.3-0.4 level, while it 
fluctuates more for the 10 percent lowest performers. We observe a decrease before and 
during crisis years for the bottom decile; from -0.1185 in 2006 to -0.2914 in 2008. This is 
equivalent to a fall of 145 percent. The top decile experiences a shorter and much less severe 
decline; from 0.3682 in 2008 to 0.3302 in 2009. This is equivalent to 10.3 percent. In 
addition, the mean for the low performers experience a larger fall in 2002-2003, before it 
increases until the financial crisis of 2008. It is clear that the 10 percent firms with the lowest 
profitability are more severely affected by the crisis than the 10 percent firms with the highest 
profitability. This is in accordance with our hypothesis.  
 
Next, we compare the standard deviation of the two key financial ratios for the two 
percentiles. First, we present the standard deviation of the operating profit margin in the graph 
below: 
 
 
FIGURE 8: STANDARD DEVIATION OF OPERATING PROFIT MARGIN - PERCENTILE 1 AND 10 
 
The standard deviations are almost identical for the two percentiles, except for in the crisis 
years of 2000 and 2008. During both crises, the standard deviation for the 10 percent lowest 
firms in terms of operating profit margin peaks. The gap is 0.055 in 2000 and 0.116 in 2008. 
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The graph clearly shows that the standard deviation increases more during crisis for the 
bottom decile in terms of profitability than for the top decile. In other words, those which 
perform poorly experience a greater volatility during recessions than those which perform in 
the top of the sample. This is in accordance with our hypothesis.  
 
 
For the standard deviation of ROA we present the graph below: 
 
FIGURE 9: STANDARD DEVIATION OF ROA - PERCENTILE 1 AND 10 
 
The curves overlap during the entire research period, except for in the crisis year of 2008. 
This year, the standard deviation of the low performers is 0.34 higher than the standard 
deviation of the high performers. This shows that poorly performing firms experience a larger 
increase in volatility during recessions than firms that perform well, and this supports our 
hypothesis. Because of our sampling criteria, it is reasonable to assume that these findings are 
conservative and that the effects are somewhat larger due to the survivorship bias. 
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6.2.2 Competitive advantage during the financial crisis of 2008 
The purpose of this thesis is to take a closer look on what effects a financial crisis has on the 
short-term stability of firms’ competitive advantages. As this is a subject that has not been 
studied before, our hypotheses are formulated from literature about general performance and 
profitability during recessions, as well as from what we as researchers find interesting to 
examine.  
 
First, we will analyze the sample as a whole. This will give us an indication of how the crisis 
affected the competitive advantages of Norwegian firms in general. The basis for our first 
hypothesis regarding competitive advantage is that during recessions, markets become more 
volatile and it becomes more difficult for companies to maintain their competitive advantages. 
This is because recessions affect the value of resources and change the rules of the game. This 
implies that the competitive advantages of some firms might lose its value, while other firms 
experience a reduction of their competitive disadvantage.  
 
Hypothesis 6: During crisis, firms’ competitive advantages become less stable. 
 
 
FIGURE 10: CORRELATION OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE – ALL FIRMS (BY OPERATING PROFIT 
MARGIN) 
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FIGURE 11: CORRELATION OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE – ALL FIRMS (BY ROA) 
 
The graph illustrating correlations of competitive advantages based on operating profit 
margins shows a quite stable progress over the entire time period of 1999-2009. However, the 
graph shows a slight increase in 1-year correlation from 04/05 to 06/07 and in 2-year 
correlation from 04/06 to 05/07. These periods are both economic booms. When crisis hits, 
the graph shows a small decline in both 1- and 2-year correlations of competitive advantage, 
from 0.67 in the 06/07 correlation to 0.624 in the 08/09 correlation, and from 0.56 in the 
05/07 correlation to 0.531 in the 07/09 correlation. This is equivalent to a 6.8 percent and 5.2 
percent decline respectively, which indicates that the competitive advantages become slightly 
less stable during the financial crisis. The effect is rather small, but we consider the graph to 
support our hypothesis, as there is an increase during the boom and a decrease during the 
crisis.  
 
The graph illustrating correlation of competitive advantage based on return on assets shows a 
similar progress as the operating profit margin-based one, with few peaks or downturns. Also, 
this graph shows a small increase before the graph decreases during the crisis. The effect 
seems to happen one year later for return on assets than for operating profit margins when we 
look at the 2-year correlation; the decline for ROA takes place between 06/08 and 07/09, 
while it starts to decline from the 05/07 correlation for the operating profit margin-based. The 
fall in correlation is slightly larger for ROA than for operating profit margins; the 1-year 
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correlation falls from 0.637 in 06/07 to 0.573 (9.5 percent) in 08/09, and the 2-year correlation 
falls from 0.519 in 06/08 to 0.488 (6 percent) in 08/10. Even though the effect for ROA is 
small, we consider the results to support our hypothesis because there is a fall during crisis. 
The graph of ROA also shows a drop for 2-year correlation during the dot-com crisis in 2000, 
which again indicates that the competitive advantages become less stable during crises. 
 
We will now take the analysis one step further by splitting the results by different firm 
characteristics. This will give us an insight into which firm characteristics that affect how 
stable firms’ competitive advantages are during crisis. The characteristics analyzed in this 
thesis are firm size, leverage and growth rate. 
 
6.2.3 Effects of firm characteristics on competitive advantage: Firm size 
The literature on how firm size affects the competitive advantages is somewhat bifurcated. 
We base our hypothesis on the literature which states that small firms are more affected 
during recessions than large firms (Geroski & Gregg, 1997; Gertler & Gilchrist, 1994 and 
Lang & Nakamura, 1995). In other words, we should expect to see a larger decline in 
correlation for small firms, and this gives grounds for the hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 7: During crisis, small firms’ competitive advantages become less stable 
than for large firms. 
 
The graphs compare the correlation of the competitive advantage variable for the smallest and 
the largest firms in the sample. The sample is divided into deciles; the blue line represents the 
10 percent smallest firms measured by sales revenue, and the red line represents the 10 
percent largest firms measured by sales revenue. 
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FIGURE 12: 1-YEAR CORRELATION: SPLIT ON FIRM SIZE (BY DRMARG) 
 
 
FIGURE 13: 2-YEAR CORRELATION: SPLIT ON FIRM SIZE (BY DRMARG) 
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one year after it hit small firms. The size of each decline is -0.059 for the smallest firms and -
0.048 for the largest firms. This is equivalent to an 8.8 and 6.8 percent decline for small and 
large firms respectively. The results support our hypothesis of competitive advantages being 
less stable for small firms than for large firms during recessions. 
 
The graph of the 2-year correlation shows that correlation declines from 0.583 in 05/07 to 
0.529 in 06/08 for small firms. This is equivalent to a fall of 9.3 percent. The graph shows that 
the correlation for large firms increases in this period, but it then declines from 0.598 in 06/08 
to 0.556 in 08/10; a fall of 7 percent. It is the correlation of 06/08 that illustrates the effect of 
the crisis the best, and with regards to the hypothesis, it is expected that the correlation for 
small firms declines more than the correlation for large firms. Focusing on this specific 
period, the graph shows that while the 2-year correlation for small firms decreases, the one for 
large firms increases. This supports our hypothesis. However, it seems that the effect comes 
one year later for the large firms. Taking this into account, small firms still experience a larger 
fall (9.3 percent) than large firms (7 percent). This also supports our hypothesis.  
 
Next, we have the results for the correlation of the competitive advantage variable computed 
from return on assets (ROA). The results are the following: 
 
 
FIGURE 14: 1-YEAR CORRELATION: SPLIT ON FIRM SIZE (BY ROA) 
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FIGURE 15: 2-YEAR CORRELATION: SPLIT ON FIRM SIZE (BY ROA) 
 
The graph shows that the 1-year correlation for the largest firms declines from 0.728 in 05/06 
to 0.558 in 08/09. The decline is steepest from 07/08 to 08/09; a fall of 16 percent. This is one 
year after the financial crisis hit.  For the smallest firms, the correlation increases between the 
years of 05/06 and 07/08, and declines from 0.637 in the 07/08 correlation to 0.551 in the 
08/09 one. This is a fall of 13 percent. For ROA, it thus seems that the large firms experience 
the largest fall in 1-year correlations. This indicates that it is the large firms that experience 
the most unstable competitive advantages during crisis, which contradicts our hypothesis. The 
2-year correlation moves in the exact same way. While the large firms experience a decrease 
in correlations from 0.608 in 05/07 to 0.487 in 07/09, a fall of almost 20 percent, the small 
firms only experience a decrease in correlations from 0.536 in 06/08 to 0.472 in 07/09, a fall 
of almost 12 percent. Also this result contradicts our hypothesis.  All in all, the results for 
return on assets do not support our hypothesis. 
 
6.2.4 Effects of firm characteristics on competitive advantage: Financial leverage 
Most of the recent studies of the relationship between capital structure and performance find 
evidence of capital structure affecting the performance of firms during recessions. The 
literature is unambiguous about that high leveraged firms are more severely affected during 
recessions than firms with low debt ratios. This tells us that we should expect to see a larger 
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drop in correlation of the competitive advantage variable for firms with high leverage. The 
general findings let us constitute the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 8: During crisis, high-leveraged firms’ competitive advantages become 
less stable than for low-leveraged firms.  
 
 
FIGURE 16: 1-YEAR CORRELATION: SPLIT ON LEVERAGE (BY DRMARG) 
 
 
FIGURE 17: 2-YEAR CORRELATION: SPLIT ON LEVERAGE (BY DRMARG) 
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The blue line represents the lowest 10 percent of the firms measured by leverage, and the red 
line represents the highest 10 percent of the firms measured by leverage. The fall in 1-year 
correlation from 0.464 in 07/08 to 0.364 in 09/10 for firms with high leverage is equivalent to 
almost 22 percent, and is steeper than for those with low leverage. Low-leveraged firms 
experience a decline from 0.713 in 06/07 to 0.651 in 09/10, a fall of almost 9 percent. 
However, the correlation for low-leveraged firms starts to decline one year before the high-
leveraged one (from the 06/07 correlation to the 07/08 one). The graph of 2-year correlations 
shows a larger difference. Low-leveraged firms experience a small decrease from 06/08 to 
07/09 before the correlation increases from 07/09 to 08/10. High-leveraged firms however, 
experience quite a long-lasting decline, from 05/07 and out. Both of the above graphs support 
the hypothesis that during a crisis, firms with high leverage have less stable competitive 
advantages than firms with low leverage. 
 
Next, we have the results for the correlation of the competitive advantage variable computed 
from return on assets (ROA) for all firms. The results are the following: 
 
 
FIGURE 18: 1-YEAR CORRELATION: SPLIT ON LEVERAGE (BY ROA) 
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FIGURE 19: 2-YEAR CORRELATION: SPLIT ON LEVERAGE (BY ROA) 
 
The first graph shows that the 1-year correlation for firms with high leverage has a steep 
decline from 0.362 in 07/08 to 0.274 in 08/09. This is equivalent to a 24.3 percent decline. 
The low-leveraged firms experience a decline from 0.644 in 06/07 to 0.58 in 07/08, a fall of 
almost 10 percent. From 2007 onwards, the curve shows an even and moderate growth. This 
analysis shows that competitive advantages become less stable for high-leveraged firms than 
for firms with low leverage, which is in accordance with our hypothesis. 
 
The curves for 2-year correlation present a more complex result. The 06/08-correlation is in 
many ways the most interesting one, because this number shows the correlation between the 
competitive advantages in 2006, which is a boom year, and 2008, which is the main year of 
the financial crisis. The two deciles in terms of leverage show different results; while low-
leveraged firms experience a decline in this correlation, the high-leveraged firms experience 
an increase. The high-leveraged firms then experience a steady decline until the 08/10-
correlation. This might indicate that the effect comes one year later for the high-leveraged 
firms. As for the size of the decline, the low-leveraged firms experience a fall from 0.534 to 
0.452 while the high-leveraged firms experience a fall from 0.239 to 0.201. This is equivalent 
to 15.3 percent and 15.9 percent respectively, and implies that the high-leveraged firms 
experience a slightly larger fall than the low-leveraged firms. The curve for the low-leveraged 
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firms then increases when the one for high-leveraged declines from 07/09 to 08/10. These 
results only barely support our hypothesis. 
 
6.2.5 Effects of firm characteristics on competitive advantage: Growth rates 
The analysis of pre-recession growth rates is three-parted. It is valuable to analyze the impact 
growth rate has on firms’ competitive advantages from different angles because growth is a 
complex and non-linear variable. First, high-growth versus low-growth firms will be 
analyzed, and then the firms in the interior range will be analyzed up against each of these.  
 
High versus low growth 
A considerable amount of literature finds that firms which experience unusually high growth 
rates prior to a recession often prove to be particularly vulnerable to recessionary pressure. 
This means that we should expect to see a larger decline in correlation of the competitive 
advantage variable for firms with higher growth rates. We state the hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 9: During crisis, the competitive advantages of firms with high sales 
growth become less stable than for firms with low sales growth. 
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FIGURE 20: 1-YEAR CORRELATION: SPLIT ON HIGH/LOW GROWTH (BY DRMARG) 
 
 
FIGURE 21: 2-YEAR CORRELATION: SPLIT ON HIGH/LOW GROWTH (BY DRMARG) 
 
First, we will describe the competitive advantage variable based on operating profit margin. 
The blue line represents the lowest 10 percent of the firms measured by growth in sales 
revenue, and the red line represents the highest 10 percent of the firms measured by growth in 
sales revenue. Between 06/07 and 08/09 both the 1-year correlation of the competitive 
variable for both high growth firms and low growth firms declines. Firms with low growth 
experience a decline of 18.2 percent, from 0.56 in 06/07 to 0.458 in 08/09, while firms with 
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high growth experience a decline of 13.7 percent, from 0.641 in 06/07 to 0.553 in 08/09. This 
implies that competitive advantages of low-growth firms become less stable during recessions 
than those of high-growth firm, and this result does not support our hypothesis. 
 
The graph of 2-year correlation shows a different result. This graph shows that firms with the 
highest growth rate experience a significant and steep fall in correlations, from 0.539 in 06/08 
to 0.415 in 08/10. This is a fall of 23 percent. The low-growth firms have quite a stable 
course, with a decrease in correlations from 0.455 in 07/09 to 0.401 in 08/10, a fall of 11.8 
percent. This result thus shows that the competitive advantages of firms with high growth 
become less stable during recessions than those of firms with low growth. This result supports 
our hypothesis. 
 
Next, we have the results for the correlation of the competitive advantage variable computed 
from return on assets (ROA) for all firms. These are the following: 
 
 
FIGURE 22: 1-YEAR CORRELATION: SPLIT ON HIGH/LOW GROWTH (BY ROA) 
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FIGURE 23: 2-YEAR CORRELATION: SPLIT ON HIGH/LOW GROWTH (BY ROA) 
 
The 1-year correlation for firms with high growth declines from 0.627 in 06/07 to 0.517 in 
07/08. This corresponds to a 17.5 percent fall. Low-growth firms experience a fall of 14.8 
percent during the same period, from 0.513 in 06/07 to 0.437 in 08/09. This is in accordance 
with our hypothesis. The 2-year correlation shows a different course. The firms with high 
growth experience a significant fall from 06/08 to 07/09. This is the same pattern as for 
operating profit margins. The correlation falls from 0.507 in 06/08 to 0.355 in 07/09, a fall of 
almost 30 percent. For low growth firms the course is different, there is a modest decline from 
0.424 in 06/08 to 0.372 in 08/10, a fall of 12.2 percent.  Both the 1-year and 2-year correlation 
show that competitive advantages of firms with high growth become less stable than those of 
low growth firms during recession, which supports our hypothesis. 
 
High versus medium growth 
Because growth is a non-linear variable, it is interesting to analyze this variable from several 
angles. We will now present the analyses where those firms in the middle of the sample in 
terms of growth are compared to those with the highest and lowest growth. Existing literature 
finds that rapidly growing and rapidly declining firms were found to be more sensitive to 
aggregate shocks, than firms in the interior of the growth range. This means that we should 
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expect to see a larger decline in correlation of the competitive advantage variable for firms 
with high growth rates. We state the hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 10: During crisis, the competitive advantages of firms with high sales growth 
become less stable than for firms with medium sales growth. 
 
Here we compared the middle decile (5) to the highest decile (10) of growth. Our results for 
the operating profit margin-based variable are as follows: 
 
 
FIGURE 24: 1-YEAR CORRELATION: SPLIT ON HIGH/MEDIUM GROWTH (BY DRMARG) 
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FIGURE 25: 2-YEAR CORRELATION: SPLIT ON HIGH/MEDIUM GROWTH (BY DRMARG) 
 
For the competitive advantage variable based on operating profit margin, firms with medium 
growth rate generally has a higher 1-year correlation coefficient than firms with high growth. 
The high-growth firms’ correlation increases more prior to the crisis than what it does for the 
medium-growth firms, but the high-growth correlation starts to decline one year ahead of the 
medium-growth one. The high-growth firms experience a decline from 0.641 in 06/07 to 
0.553 in 08/09, a fall of 13.7 percent. This decline is steeper than that of medium-growth 
firms. These experience a decline of 8.7 percent, from 0.7 in 06/07 to 0.639 in 08/09. This 
implies that the competitive advantages of high-growth firms become less stable during crisis 
than those of medium-growth firms. This supports our hypothesis. 
 
The 2-year correlation looks somewhat different; the correlation for high-growth firms 
steadily increases from 2003 through 2007, when it all of a sudden falls by 18.7 percent from 
0.539 in the 06/08 correlation to 0.438 in the 07/09 correlation. The correlation for medium-
growth firms also increases in a steady manner from 2003, but starts to decline from 0.628 in 
the 05/07 correlation to 0.553 in the 06/08 correlation, i.e. one year ahead of the high growth 
one. This decrease is equivalent to 15 percent. From there it increases between 06/08 and 
07/09, before it declines slightly between the latter and the 08/10 correlation. The decrease in 
correlation is steeper for the firms with high growth, which implies that these firms 
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experience more unstable competitive advantages during recessions than firms with medium 
growth. The results support the hypothesis. 
 
Next, we look at the results from the correlation of the competitive advantage variable based 
on ROA: 
 
 
FIGURE 26: 1-YEAR CORRELATION: SPLIT ON HIGH/MEDIUM GROWTH (BY ROA) 
 
 
FIGURE 27: 2-YEAR CORRELATION: SPLIT ON HIGH/MEDIUM GROWTH (BY ROA) 
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We observe the same trends for the ROA-based competitive advantage variable as for the 
operating margin-based. The 1-year correlation of the medium-growth firms generally has a 
higher coefficient than the one for high-growth firms. Also here, the high-growth correlation 
starts to decline one year ahead of the medium-growth one, namely from 06/07 onwards. The 
high-growth firms experience a fall of 17.5 percent; from 0.627 in 06/07 to 0.517 in 08/09. 
The only decline that the medium-growth firms have is from 0.651 in the 07/08 correlation to 
0.592 in the 08/09 correlation, after which we observe an abrupt increase. The decrease is 
equivalent to 9 percent. This implies that the decrease is steeper for the high-growth firms, 
which supports our hypothesis. 
 
The 2-year correlation ROA-based competitive advantage variable is also somewhat similar to 
the operating margin-based. It increases steadily from 03/05 onwards, when the medium-
growth correlation starts to decline from the 05/07 correlation, one year ahead of the high-
growth one. The medium-growth firms experience a longer-lasting, but slow decline by from 
0.573 in 05/07 to 0.516 in 07/09. This is equivalent to almost 10 percent. The high-growth 
firms declines between the 06/08 and the 07/09 correlation, from 0.507 to 0.355 respectively. 
This is a fall of almost 30 percent. The high-growth firms experience a significantly steeper 
decline in correlations than the medium-growth firms, and this supports the hypothesis.  
 
Low versus medium growth 
Existing literature finds that rapidly growing and rapidly declining firms were found to be 
more sensitive to aggregate shocks than firms in the interior of the growth range. This means 
that we should expect to see a larger decline in correlation of the competitive advantage 
variable for firms with low growth rates. We state the hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 11: During crisis, the competitive advantages of firms with low sales growth 
become less stable than for firms with medium sales growth. 
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Here we have compared the lowest growth percentile (1) to the middle growth percentile (5) 
of the competitive advantage variable based on operating profit margin. The results follow: 
 
 
FIGURE 28: 1-YEAR CORRELATION: SPLIT ON LOW/MEDIUM GROWTH (BY DRMARG) 
 
 
FIGURE 29: 2-YEAR CORRELATION: SPLIT ON LOW/MEDIUM GROWTH (BY DRMARG) 
 
For the competitive advantage variable based on operating profit margin, firms with medium 
growth rate generally has a higher 1-year correlation coefficient than firms with low growth. 
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In addition, the 1-year correlation does not fluctuate as much for the medium-growth firms as 
it does for the low-growth firms throughout the entire period from 1999-2010. The medium-
growth correlation declines steadily from 0.7 in the 06/07 correlation to 0.639 in the 08/09 
correlation, a fall of 8.7 percent. By comparison, the correlation for low-growth firms decline 
from 0.56 in the 06/07 correlation to 0.458 in the 08/09 correlation. This is equivalent to an 
18.2 percent decline. The low-growth firms then experience a sudden increase between 08/09 
and 09/10. The analysis shows that low-growth firms experience a steeper decline in 
correlations than medium-growth firms, and these results support our hypothesis. 
 
The 2-year correlation for medium-growth firms also has a generally higher correlation 
coefficient than the one for low-growth firms, but the correlations fluctuate more for both of 
the growth deciles. We observe a small increase of the two curves from the 06/08 correlation 
to the 07/09 correlation, which is a somewhat surprising result due to the fact that this is 
during the main crisis years. Nevertheless, the increase is larger for the medium-growth firms 
by 0.02 versus a mere 0.003 increase for the low-growth firms. This is equivalent to 3.6 
percent and 0.7 percent respectively. The increase is followed by a decline for the two 
correlations, from 0.455 in 07/09 to 0.401 in 08/10 for the low-growth firms (11.9 percent) 
and from 0.573 in 07/09 to 0.557 in 08/10 for the medium-growth firms (2.8 percent). In other 
words, the fall in correlations is steeper for the low-growth firms. This indicates that the 
competitive advantages of low-growth firms become more unstable during crisis than those of 
medium-growth firms. These results support our hypothesis. 
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Next, we look at the results from the correlation of the competitive advantage variable based 
on ROA: 
 
 
FIGURE 30: 1-YEAR CORRELATION: SPLIT ON LOW/MEDIUM GROWTH (BY ROA) 
 
 
FIGURE 31: 2-YEAR CORRELATION: SPLIT ON LOW/MEDIUM GROWTH (BY ROA) 
 
Just like the ROA-results for high-growth versus medium-growth firms, we observe the same 
trends for ROA-based variable as for operating margin-based variable for low-growth versus 
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medium-growth. The 1-year correlation of the medium-growth firms generally has a higher 
coefficient than the one for low-growth firms, and the curves follow each other in a parallel 
manner. Regardless of this result, the decline from the 06/07 correlation to the 08/09 
correlation is steeper for the low-growth firms by -0.076 versus -0.062 for medium-growth 
firms. This is equivalent to 14.8 percent and 9.5 percent respectively, which implies that the 
competitive advantages of low-growth firms become less stable during crisis than those of 
medium-growth firms. We conclude that the results support our hypothesis. 
 
The 2-year correlation for medium-growth firms also has a generally higher correlation 
coefficient than the one for low-growth firms. From the 06/08 correlation to the 08/10 
correlation, the decline is steeper for the low-growth firms than for medium-growth firms, by 
-0.052 (12.2 percent) and -0.04 (7.2 percent) respectively. However, the decline of the 
correlation for medium-growth firms has its origin in the 05/07 correlation, but if we add this 
to the decline for this percentile, it results in -0.06, a total fall of 10.5 percent. In other words, 
the low-growth firms experience a steeper decline than the medium-growth firms, whether the 
fall from 05/07-correlation is included or not. The result thus implies that the competitive 
advantages of low-growth firms become less stable during crisis than those of medium-
growth firms, which supports our hypothesis. Because of our sampling criteria, it is 
reasonable to assume that these findings are conservative, and that the effects are somewhat 
larger due to the survivorship bias. 
 
6.3 Summary of findings 
To sum up, the analyses showed that the financial crisis affected both aggregated firm 
performance and the short-term stability of the competitive advantages. The first analyses 
examined the aggregated firm performance of Norwegian firms during the financial crisis, and 
found that both operating profit margins, return on assets and sales growth declined 
significantly. Further analyses showed that firms in the bottom decile based on profitability 
experienced a larger decline in both operating profit margins and return on assets than firms in 
the top decile. Next, analyses of standard deviation showed that the Norwegian economy 
became more volatile during the crisis. Also here, further analyses found that the effect was 
more severe for the bottom decile, in terms of profitability, than for the top decile.  
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The next set of analyses examined the stability of competitive advantages during recessions. 
First, the analyses of the sample as a whole showed that competitive advantages based on 
both operating profit margins and return on assets became less stable during the crisis. Next, 
the effects of different firm characteristics were examined. The first analyses explored the 
effects of firm size on the stability of competitive advantages, and found that the effects were 
different for the two different profitability measures used to compute the competitive 
advantage variable. When the variable is based on operating profit margins, small firms were 
found to be more severely affected than large firms, while the analysis of the variable based 
on return on assets found the opposite result. The next analyses explored the effect of 
financial leverage, and showed that competitive advantages become less stable for highly 
leveraged firms, than for low-leveraged firms during crisis. This is true for competitive 
advantages based on both operating profit margins and return on assets. Last, the effects of 
pre-crisis sales growth rate were explored. Since this is a non-linear variable, the effects for 
both low, medium and high growth were analyzed. First we found that the competitive 
advantages of firms with high pre-crisis growth were less stable than for those of firms with 
low growth rates. Next, we found that the competitive advantages of high- and low-growth 
firms became less stable than for medium growth firms. To sum up, performance declines and 
volatility increases, and competitive advantages become less stable, during recessions. Highly 
leveraged firms or firms with high pre-recession growth experience the most instability in 
competitive advantages and the effects of size depends on the chosen profitability measure.  
 
7. Discussion and implications 
7.1 Introduction  
The purpose of this thesis was to conduct a quantitative analysis on secondary financial data 
to find out how recessions affect the short-term stability of firms’ competitive advantages, and 
how firm characteristics affect the outcome. Our motives were to deliver a contribution to the 
NHH research project Crisis, Restructuring and Growth, to present new insights and fill some 
of the gaps in the strategic management field, and to present some directions for future studies 
on the subject. 
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This section will present the main findings of the study, give interpretations of the results, and 
discuss possible implications for future research. First, we will present findings that highlight 
the effect of the financial crisis of 2008 on Norwegian firms. Second, we will show the effect 
the financial crisis of 2008 had on the short-term stability of firms’ competitive advantages 
and the influence of different firm characteristics on the effect, before we discuss some 
possible explanations for the results. Finally, limitations in the study will be discussed, before 
results and discussions are summarized in a final conclusion. 
 
7.2 Discussion of the results 
7.2.1 – Main Finding I: The crisis had negative impact on firm performance  
 in Norway 
7.2.1.1 The crisis had negative impact on aggregate firm performance in Norway 
To affirm the effect of the financial crisis on Norwegian companies, the first analyses 
investigated the progress of profitability and volatility of Norwegian firms. When it comes to 
profitability, we found that both average and median operating profit margins and return on 
assets experienced significant drops during the crisis years. The effect occurred one year 
earlier for operating profit margins than for return on assets, but both profitability measures 
declined considerably. The mean declined more than 40 percent and the median almost 30 
percent for operating profit margins, while the mean fell almost 60 percent and the median 32 
percent for return on assets. These results support the findings of Geroski and Gregg (1997), 
who found that average profit margins vary procyclically. Similarly, our results showed that 
the average and median sales growth experienced a steep decline during the crisis, indicating 
a significant fall in demand and sales. The demand declined so severely that the Norwegian 
economy experienced a negative aggregated sales growth in 2008 by median and in 2009 by 
mean. These results indicate that the financial crisis had a considerable negative effect on the 
aggregate firm performance of Norwegian firms.  
 
The analyses also showed that the Norwegian economy became more volatile during the 
financial crisis. The standard deviation of both operating profit margins and return on assets 
increased significantly during the years of the financial crisis. Geroski and Gregg (1997) 
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found that there was a significant rise in the standard deviation of profit margins during 
recessions, and our results coincide with this. The effects peaked at different time periods for 
the two variables; the standard deviation of return on assets peaks one year later (2009) than 
that of operating profit margins (2008). This coincides with the fact that the effect on 
operating profit margins comes one year ahead of the effect on return on assets. Whatever the 
reason for this effect, the analyses clearly show that the Norwegian market became more 
volatile during the financial crisis.  
 
The analyses found results confirming that the financial crisis had negative impact on firm 
performance, but the results do not reveal anything about what underlying effects that have 
caused the reduction in firm performance. According to literature, there are many different 
reasons that may have caused these effects; e.g. reductions in demand for the products the 
companies offer, problems with excess capacity, inventories or indebtedness, cash flow 
constraints, problems accessing capital and changes in inter-industry competition (Geroski & 
Gregg, 1997; Lien, 2010; Nishimura, et al., 2005). Based on our analyses, it is not possible to 
decide which of these factors that caused the most problems during the financial crisis of 
2008. However, the results are still important as they underline the negative effect of the crisis 
on the Norwegian economy, and why it is interesting to further explore the impact of the 
crisis. They also showed that the crisis hit Norway as an exogenous shock and that it was 
unanticipated, thus satisfying the conditions of a natural experiment. If it had been 
anticipated, the adaptation to it would have been initiated earlier, and some kind of later 
treatment would probably not have been as necessary. When a bubble bursts, it will always 
come as a shock to everyone, and our results easily satisfy these terms. 
 
7.2.1.2 The average performance of the lowest performing firms falls more during crisis 
than the average performance of the highest performing firms. The lowest 
performing firms also experience more volatile markets during crisis than the 
highest performing firms.  
The analyses found that both operating profit margins and ROA declined during recessions 
for both the 10 percent highest performing firms and the 10 percent lowest performing firms. 
The results showed that the ratios for firms within the lower decile based on profitability fell 
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further than for the firms in the top decile. These results follow findings in the literature of 
Geroski and Gregg (1997), who investigated the upper and lower quartile of operating profit 
margin for 2,300 large UK companies in the period of 1971-93. They found that the spread in 
of margins across firms was greater than the variation in median and mean margins over time, 
and that margins for firms within the lower quartile of the sample fell further than the margins 
of the firms in the top quartile. Our results coincide with this. For the firms in the upper 
decile, the average operating profit margin increased just prior to crisis years. We observed 
the same results for average ROA. What we see more generally, is that the spread of firm 
performance measured by average operating profit margin and average ROA increases in 
recessions, and that some firms manage to maintain high performance even in times that are 
difficult. Geroski and Gregg (1997) explained their findings with a relatively small percentage 
of firms had profits falling relatively heavy. This group will pull down the percentile average, 
and can be an explanation of why we observe the large dips in average operating profit 
margin and average ROA for the firms in the lowest decile. Maybe the opposite can count for 
the firms in the highest decile. Alchian (1950) and Friedman (1953) stated that the least 
productive firms leave the market, while the most productive ones survive, and we can deduce 
that this is also true during crisis. Even if we cannot say anything about how many of the 
firms in the lowest decile that go out of the market in recessions or how many that survive 
based on the analyses of average operating profit margin and ROA, it is plausible that this 
decile represents a group where many of the firms go bankrupt. We can assume this from the 
increasingly negative average operating profit margin and ROA, which is a very bad token of 
a firm’s condition before, during and after a crisis. 
 
Next, we wanted to take a closer look on whether firms with lower profitability experience a 
more volatile market during times of crisis than firms with high profitability prior to the crisis. 
The analysis of the standard deviation showed the 10 percent lowest performing firms in the 
population experienced a larger increase in standard deviation during crisis years, than the 10 
percent highest performing firms did. This result held through for both profitability measures, 
which implies that those firms that initially perform poorly experience more volatile market 
conditions during a crisis, than firms that perform well before the crisis hits.  
 
 79 
 
7.2.2 – Main finding II: Competitive advantages become less stable during crisis 
The main purpose of this thesis is to examine what happens to the short-term stability of 
firms’ competitive advantages during crises. As this is a subject which is practically non-
existing in current literature, our hypotheses was formulated from literature of general firm 
performance during recessions, as well as what we would expect to see from literature of 
competitive advantages. The first hypothesis stated that competitive advantages would be less 
stable during times of crisis. This was hypothesized because crises cause firms to face new 
challenges in a changing economic environment. Competitive advantages are caused by 
resources that the firms possess. The value of these resources might change as a consequence 
of the changes in the economic climate, and this makes it more difficult for firms to maintain 
their competitive advantages. This indicates that competitive advantages become less stable 
during times of crisis. The results we found for the whole sample was somewhat vague. The 
graphs for both operating profit margins and return on assets were rather flat, but there was a 
small increase in correlations during the boom and a small decrease during the crisis. Even 
though the effect was small, we considered the hypothesis to be supported. This implies that 
firms’ competitive advantages become less stable during recessions. However, it is interesting 
to discuss why the effect was so small. The financial crisis affected different companies 
differently. Even though some industries were severely hit by the crisis, others were almost 
unaffected, and this flattens out the graph for the whole sample. The results are diluted by 
large and stable industries that are rather unaffected by the crisis. These results make it 
interesting to investigate the crisis further, on more fragmented levels. Which firms were 
severely hit by the crisis, and which firms were less affected? Did size, leverage or pre-crisis 
growth have any impact on how severely companies were affected by the crisis? 
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7.2.3 – Main finding III: Firm characteristics affect the stability of competitive  
       advantages during crisis 
7.2.3.1 During crisis, the competitive advantages of small firms become less stable than for those 
of large firms when the competitive advantage variable is based on operating profit 
margins. When the competitive advantage variable is based on return on assets, large 
firms’ competitive advantages become less stable than for those of small firms.  
Following findings in the literature review (Geroski & Gregg, 1997; Gertler & Gilchrist, 1994 
and Lang & Nakamura, 1995), it was hypothesized that the competitive advantages of small 
firms were less stable during a crisis, than those of large firms. The results were contradictory 
for the two different profitability measures that the competitive advantage variable is based 
on. Based on operating profit margin, the 1-year and 2-year correlation tests found that the 
correlation of the competitive advantage fell harder for the 10 percent smallest firms in the 
population, than it did for the 10 percent largest firms measured by sales revenue. This 
supports our hypothesis, and is also in accordance with Geroski and Gregg (1997), Gertler 
and Gilchrist (1994) and Lang and Nakamura (1995). This result may be explained by the 
economies of scale and easier access to external finance and other resources that larger firms 
enjoy, and that make them better equipped to handle recessions than small firms. However, 
the 1-year and 2-year correlation tests for the ROA-based competitive advantage found the 
opposite results; the 10 percent largest firms experienced a more severe fall in correlation than 
the 10 percent smallest firms. These findings tell us that larger firms’ competitive advantages 
are less stable during a crisis, than those of the smaller firms, which contradicts our 
hypothesis. However, these results are in accordance with the findings of Knudsen (2011). He 
explains that the largest firms are more severely hit by a crisis, because smaller firms are more 
flexible than larger firms. Large firms tend to be more rigid than smaller firms, which makes 
it more difficult to adjust business when demand drops. Another explanation for why large 
firms experience less stable competitive advantages during recessions, is that large firms more 
often sell durable products than small firms, and thus are more exposed to declines in demand 
than small firms during economic downturns. Yet another possible explanation is that large 
firms are more export intensive, and since the financial crisis of 2008 hit most of Norway’s 
international trade partners, it is reasonable to believe that this affected the competitive 
advantage of export intensive firms.  What we can draw from the two conflicting results is 
that differences in firm size in one way or another contributes to differences in the stability of 
competitive advantages.  
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An interesting discussion is what causes the contradictory results between the analyses based 
on the two different profitability measures. When competitive advantage is measured based 
on operating profit margins, the results show that the competitive advantages of small firms 
are less stable during crisis than those of large firms. When competitive advantage is 
measured based on return on assets, the results show the opposite; the large firms experience 
less stable competitive advantages during crisis than small firms do. There are some possible 
explanations for why we see two different effects from firm size depending on which 
financial ratio our competitive advantage variable is based on. The main explanation might be 
related to the firm’s assets. Larger firms often have larger shares of fixed assets, e.g. 
machinery, plants and other manufacturing equipment, than smaller firms. “Total assets” is 
the denominator of the ROA-variable, which implies that firms with large assets will be more 
affected in terms of ROA when revenues decline during recessions. This indicates that larger 
firms will be more affected in terms of ROA than small firms, and this may explain why the 
large firms experience less stable competitive advantages when the CA-variable is based on 
ROA. However, this does not apply for firms in the service sector. Another explanation is 
related to operating profit margins. Because of market power, larger firms often have higher 
operating profit margin than smaller firms, and it is in their interest to maintain it during 
recessions. They will therefore rather decrease sales volume than reduce the price. Small 
firms are price takers, and therefore have to let their operating profit margin drop in order to 
maintain business. Higher margins make the larger firms able to handle more challenges than 
small firms before they start to really suffer economically. This might explain why the smaller 
firms experience less stable competitive advantages than larger firms, when the CA-variable 
is based on operating profit margins. 
 
Other explanations for the difference in results which are not related directly to the choice of 
variable may be differences in inventory between small and large firms, flexibility, financing 
and scale effects. A bigger inventory of goods might contribute to the larger firms being better 
equipped to handle a crisis. They can experience a lower decline in sales revenue because 
they have more inventories to sell, and they do not necessarily have to produce new products 
right there and then. Again, this does not apply for the firms in the service sector. This, in 
addition to differences in the length of contractual obligations, might explain why the effects 
of the crisis hit the larger firms one year later than it hit the small firms. Large firms tend to 
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have longer lasting contracts, and thus have a fixed demand for their products for some time. 
This delays the effects of the crisis. 
 
Larger firms often experience economies of scale and an easier access to external finance 
during a crisis. Since the financial crisis of 2008 brought with it a credit crunch, which were 
also felt by firms in Norway, this could be the most probable explanation for why smaller 
firms’ competitive advantages are less stable during crisis. On the other hand, large firms are 
often more rigid than small firms, and changes in the economy as a whole can have greater 
consequences for larger firms than for small firms. The large firms might take less action in 
recessions than small firms, and this could be a combination of at least two things: them being 
bureaucratic and unable to adapt to the changes, and that they think the crisis is only going to 
be short-term. The latter may lead to the firm suffering for some time, in order to recover later 
when “the storm has passed.” Large firms have the possibility to choose not to make changes 
that will reduce profitability in the long run because they have resources and ruggedness to 
handle short-term declines in profitability. Small firms do not have the same option, and the 
changes they have to make may turn out to be unprofitable in the long run. Another feature 
that might have affected the results is the share of exports.  
 
Finally, we should remember the fact that we are investigating Norwegian data, which means 
that our largest firms may be small in an international context. Our result that larger firms’ 
competitive advantages are less stable, may be partially explained by this. One should also 
look out for possible biases attached to the removal of small firms from the population 
sample, and the negative effects such choices may have for generalizability. Future studies 
should be aware of the country of origin from which the data they use come from.  
 
7.2.3.2 The competitive advantages of high-leveraged firms become less stable during crisis than 
those of low-leveraged firms 
The literature review clearly showed that companies with high debt ratios will be more 
severely affected by a recession than companies with low debt ratios. From this, it was 
hypothesized that the competitive advantages of highly leveraged firms become less stable 
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during a crisis than those of firms with low leverage. Our 1-year and 2-year correlations found 
proof for the hypothesis, independent of the financial ratio the competitive advantage variable 
was based on. This means that the highest 10 percent of the firms measured by leverage have 
got a lower probability than earlier of performing according to the last year, and the lowest 10 
percent of the firms measured by leverage have got a higher probability than earlier of 
performing accordingly. From the results we can say that firms’ capital structure contributes 
to differences in the stability of competitive advantages and disadvantages; low-leveraged 
firms have more stable competitive advantages, and high-leveraged firms have less stable 
competitive advantages. This effect expands during times of crisis.  
 
Possible explanations can be capital market imperfections, which can make it difficult for 
highly leveraged firms to get access to external finance (Lien, 2010). The reason is that these 
firms often have more risk.  Also, high-leveraged firms are often export or import intensive 
firms that have high costs, which can lead to lower operating profit margin. Opler and Titman 
(1994) highlights the high direct and indirect costs of financial distress as an explanation for 
high-leveraged firms to be more affected by crisis than firms with low debt ratios. These 
results contradict Miller & Modigliani’s (1958) first proposition, which claims that capital 
structure does not affect firm value. Critics argue that the proposition does not hold because 
the real world involves taxes, financial distress, bankruptcy costs and conflict of interest 
among shareholders, and our results support these arguments. This will affect the competitive 
advantage variable through lower ROA or operating profit margin. Future studies should 
investigate the relationship between leverage and stability of competitive advantages in 
further detail. 
 
7.2.3.3 The competitive advantages of firms with high sales growth become less stable during 
crisis than those of firms with low sales growth 
Following findings in the literature review, it was hypothesized that the competitive 
advantages of firms with high growth were less stable during a crisis than those of firms with 
low growth. With the exception of 1-year correlation for operating profit margins, our 1-year 
and 2-year correlations found proof for the hypothesis. This means that the highest 10 percent 
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of the firms measured by growth will struggle more to maintain their competitive advantages 
than the lowest 10 percent of the firms will.  
 
Possible explanations for the results can be that companies experiencing a high growth late in 
a boom will experience a steep decline in demand for their products during a crisis, because 
these firms have a large share of marginal customers which will be the first ones to cut 
consumption in difficult times (Lien, 2010). Other explanations for this, is connected to the 
liquidity and solidity of high-growth firms. These firms often have many attractive investment 
opportunities, which lead to high opportunity costs of building financial reserves. They will 
choose to invest rather than pay off debt or in other ways increase their liquidity, and firms 
with low liquidity are thus more severely hit during crisis. Further, it can be difficult to 
combine high growth with efficiency. Operational efficiency is often reduced by large 
expansions, and poor operational activities make the firms even more vulnerable during 
recessions. Capacity expansion often lags behind growth in demand for a firm’s products, 
which indicates that fast-growing firms are stuck with idle capacity when crisis hits. This can 
negatively affect the stability of competitive advantages during crisis. All our graphs support 
the hypothesis, except for the 1-year correlation based on operating profit margin, which 
shows the opposite result. We do not know the exact reason for this result, but it may have 
something to do with the fact that growth is a complex and non-linear variable. Future studies 
should investigate this relationship further. 
 
7.2.3.4 The competitive advantages of firms with high sales growth become less stable during 
crisis than those of firms with medium sales growth 
Following findings in the literature review, it was hypothesized that the competitive 
advantages of firms with high growth were less stable during a crisis, than those of firms with 
medium growth. Both our 1-year and 2-year correlations based on operating profit margin, 
and our 1-year and 2-year correlations based on ROA found proof for the hypothesis. This 
means that the highest 10 percent of the firms measured by growth have got a lower 
probability than before of maintaining their competitive advantages than the medium 10 
percent of firms measured by growth. 
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Possible explanations for this result are the same as for finding 7.2.3.3 about high and low 
growth. Issues of large shares of marginal customers, squeezed liquidity, poor operational 
efficiency and lag in capacity building will all make high-growth firms more vulnerable for 
recessions than medium-growth firms that do not experience the same problems. Future 
research will have to investigate this further. 
 
7.2.3.5 The competitive advantages of firms with low sales growth become less stable during 
crisis than those of firms with medium sales growth 
Following findings in the literature review, it was hypothesized that the competitive 
advantages of firms with low growth were less stable during a crisis, than those of firms with 
medium growth. Both our 1-year and 2-year correlations based on operating profit margin, 
and our 1-year and 2-year correlations based on ROA found proof for the hypothesis. With 
support for our hypothesis, the results tell us that the lowest 10 percent of the firms measured 
by growth have got a lower probability than earlier of performing according to the last year, 
which implies that they have less stable competitive advantages.  
 
Possible explanations for these findings can be that many firms with low growth have a poor 
performance prior to the crisis, which will worsen when the crisis hits. This will make the 
competitive advantages less stable and the curves in the graphs to fluctuate. Future research 
will have to investigate this relationship further. 
 
To sum up the findings regarding pre-recession growth rates, the results show that the firms 
with high growth prior to the crisis experience the most unstable competitive advantages 
when crisis hits. The competitive advantages of these firms are less stable than both those of 
low-growth and those of medium-growth firms. Further, the results showed that it is the firms 
with medium growth that experience the most stable competitive advantages during crisis. In 
other words, the competitive advantages of high-growth companies are most negatively 
affected by crisis, and then follow the competitive advantages of low-growth companies. The 
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firms in the interior range of pre-recession growth are the least negatively affected in terms of 
the short-term stability of competitive advantages when crisis hits. It is reasonable to assume 
that this is because both high-growth and low-growth firms have characteristics that makes 
them more vulnerable to crisis. Those in the top decile in terms of growth most likely 
experience extraordinary growth caused by marginal customers that leave the market when 
crisis hits, squeezed liquidity, poor operational efficiency and lag in capacity building. The 
firms in the bottom decile in terms of growth experience hard times even before the crisis hits, 
and an economic downturn will make it even more difficult for these firms to maintain their 
competitive advantages.  
 
7.3 Theoretical implications and directions for future studies 
We want to give directions for future studies which can contribute to filling some of the 
remaining gaps in the strategic management field. Our first suggestion is to conduct analyses 
of the sustainability of firms’ competitive advantages, as a continuation of our study. This can 
be done when the distance to the financial crisis of 2008 is considered suitable, and when data 
from these years has been collected. As mentioned in chapter 1.3, the theory does not give an 
answer to the exact number of years that defines a sustainable competitive advantage. 
However, we consider the term ‘sustainability’ to imply several years, and will advise the 
researcher to make a subjective consideration of the exact appropriate time frame. 
 
Our next suggestion is to conduct analyses on industry level. Our dataset consists of industries 
parceled in individual 2-digit NACE codes, and industry groups (appendix B). Each industry 
group is a collection of similar industries identified by 2-digit NACE codes. The dataset could 
be split into industries, and one could base hypotheses on different industry characteristics 
and the respective theoretical background. However, one should be careful with the use of the 
industry groups as a grouping prior to the analysis. The reason for this is that the industry 
groups can be considered too broad, because some of them are classified by industry codes 
which are too heterogeneous internally. It can thus be difficult to generalize and draw 
conclusions based on the analysis results. Analyses on industry codes are more transparent, 
and in addition to the industry analyses we suggest splitting the industry codes into deciles or 
quartiles based on firm- and industry characteristics. For instance, one can explore which 
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industries that were severely affected by the crisis and compare the competitive advantages of 
these to the competitive advantages of industries that were not affected by the crisis. Further, 
instead of using NACE-codes, one can conduct multiple case studies on an industry level 
where one defines the industry boundaries from a meaningful industry definition that is more 
precise than the one official statistics are using. This makes it possible to investigate what 
happens in specific industries in greater detail. Another suggestion is to conduct the same 
analyses on similar datasets or samples from other countries. If one observes similar results 
from these analyses as we have found in our study, this would strengthen our research and 
make it easier to generalize the findings. One could also complement our study by using other 
types of firm characteristics or measures of profitability, and find other interesting results. 
 
Our last suggestion is that one could do a qualitative study based on primary survey data as an 
alternative to financial data. Another option is to combine the two, to eliminate as many 
weaknesses as possible. Survey data can make it possible to find out exactly how firm 
profitability was affected by the crisis, e.g. if the crisis mostly reduced the demand for the 
firms’ products, or if the problems were related to access to external capital, excess inventory, 
etc. In addition, survey data can reveal information about other types of firm characteristics, 
industry characteristics and firm behavior during crisis. By conducting a survey, one could get 
access to information that could be used to categorize firms in other ways than from the 
information available through financial data.  Examples of firm characteristics that are 
difficult to identify through financial data are R&D, knowledge-intensity and customer 
loyalty, while industry characteristics like rivalry, bargaining power, competitors and 
substitutes also can be used as categorizations. Since we have found that firm size, leverage 
and growth affect the short-term stability of firms’ competitive advantages it would be 
interesting to use surveys to get information about firms with different leverage- and growth 
strategies. Finally, subjective evaluations of firms’ performance relative to its competitors, i.e. 
survey data on market shares, could also provide new valuable insights. 
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7.4 Limitations 
All studies have limitations, implying that the findings must be carefully interpreted in 
relation to its limitations. In the following, limitations in this study will be presented.  
 
The validity of a study is the extent to which the data collection method accurately measures 
what it was intended to measure, and the extent to which research findings are really about 
what they profess to be about (Saunders et al., 2009). There are some concerns to the validity 
of this study. Firstly, the analyses in this study are based on a sample rather than the whole 
population of Norwegian firms, and by excluding a number of firms the external validity of 
the study is reduced. However, this is done in order to remove firms that might have caused 
inaccurate results. The internal validity is also fragile to the sampling procedure, because the 
results theoretically may come from the selection of the firms to the sample, rather than being 
effects from the crisis.  Firms that go bankrupt or start up during the analysis years are 
excluded from the sample because of missing observations, and this causes a firm-age bias. A 
weakness related to the sample is the survivorship bias - the bias related to only studying 
surviving firms.  Another limitation with regards to the sample is that all firms with sales 
revenue less than 10.0 MNOK (in 2007 and adjusted according to CPI) have been removed. 
This excludes a large number of small firms, which might affect the analysis of the effects of 
firm size. When interpreting these results it is important to remember that all of the smallest 
companies have been removed from the sample. However, our sampling criteria are 
conducted in order to achieve results that are as accurate as possible.  
 
Competitive advantage is in this study quantified in accordance with the definition of Barney 
(2007); a firm that has economic returns above the industry mean has a competitive 
advantage. We have chosen the two profitability variables operating profit margins and return 
on assets as measures of economic returns, but there exists no literature that suggests that this 
is the correct way to do it. In addition, it is impossible to analyze whether it actually is 
competitive advantage or disadvantage that causes returns above or below industry average. 
There may be many different reasons for why firms are performing the way they do; Porter 
(1985) for instance states that above-average performance also can be a sign of harvesting. 
However, it is impossible to explore what is causing the returns of each firm in the sample in 
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a study of this scope, so this is why we, according to the definition, assume that profitability 
above industry average implies that the firm has a competitive advantage. 
 
Our study is conducted entirely from financial data. This makes it easy to see patterns and 
draw objective conclusions from analyses, but it does not say anything about what is behind 
the numbers. In order to understand this, more qualitative analyses should have been 
conducted, e.g. surveys or interviews. However, as mentioned, the scope of this thesis makes 
these kinds of additional analyses impossible.  
 
There are also some limitations in regards to using correlation as the only analytical tool. 
While the correlation analysis clarifies whether there is a relationship between variables, it 
does not say whether or not the relationship is causal. In order to prove this, more 
experimental methods, like regression analysis, must be conducted. The last limitation is that 
the study is based on Norwegian data. It is important to interpret the results with this in mind. 
The results would have been different for other samples from other countries that were 
affected differently by the crisis than Norway was.  
 
7.5 Concluding remarks 
The purpose of this study was to analyze how recessions affected the short-term relative 
economic performance between firms by measuring the short-term stability of Norwegian 
firms’ competitive advantages and disadvantages during the financial crisis of 2008. A further 
purpose was to explore whether specific firm characteristics affected the changes in their 
stability. The study is a part of the NHH research project Crisis, Restructuring and Growth. 
As far as we know, no previous studies have analyzed the effect of recessions on firms’ 
competitive advantages. In addition, the literature in the strategic management field is 
inadequate when it comes to research on firms’ relative performance during recessions, and a 
lot of relevant literature is simply byproducts of financial or macroeconomic research. It was 
therefore natural for us to focus on the broad patterns and the short-term effects of the crisis, 
instead of the long-term effects. Based on the literature gaps, we wanted to make a 
contribution to the field by i) analyze how the financial crisis of 2008 affected the profitability 
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of Norwegian firms, ii) analyze the financial crisis’ effect on the short-term stability of the 
firms’ competitive advantages and iii) analyze how different firm characteristics can influence 
the effect that the crisis had on the stability of the competitive advantages. Finally, we wanted 
to give some directions for future studies on the subject. 
 
The main findings of this study and important implications of the results are presented in the 
following. The first main result was that the financial crisis of 2008 had considerable negative 
impact on the aggregate firm performance of Norwegian firms. The main implication of such 
findings is that we can use the financial crisis of 2008 as a natural experiment as described in 
chapter 1.2. The analyses also show that the Norwegian economy became more volatile 
during the financial crisis, and why it is interesting to further explore the impact of the crisis. 
However, the results do not reveal anything about what underlying effects that have caused 
the reduction in firm performance, and this should be explored in further detail by future 
studies.  
 
Further analyses of firms’ performance during the financial crisis of 2008 showed that firms 
in the bottom decile in terms of profitability experienced a steeper decline in both operating 
profit margins and return on assets during crisis years than the firms in the top decile. In 
addition, the low-performance firms experienced a steeper increase in standard deviations of 
both profitability measures during crisis years than the high-performance firms. These 
findings show that firms that are performing poorly before an economic downturn are those 
who are most affected by the recession, both in terms of profitability and volatility.  
 
The second main finding of the study found that firms’ competitive advantages were less 
stable in crisis, and more stable in booms, but the effects were small. It is plausible to think 
that this is due to the heterogeneity of the population, i.e. that each firm managed differently, 
causing the results to be diluted. The main implication of this finding is that it can give 
directions for relationships between firm characteristics and firm performance to be studied in 
more detail. We therefore investigated the effects on more fragmented levels. This led us to 
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the last main finding of the study; that different firm characteristics affected the stability of 
firms’ competitive advantages. 
 
Out first finding regarding firm characteristics was that the effect of firm size on the stability 
of competitive advantages depends on the profitability measure used to compute the 
competitive advantage variable. When competitive advantage was computed based on 
operating profit margins, the competitive advantages of small firms were found to be less 
stable than those of large firms during crisis.  When competitive advantage was computed 
based on return on assets, the results were opposite. Different reasons for the contradicting 
results were discussed, and we concluded with differences in firm size in one way or another 
contributed to differences in the stability of competitive advantages. This result underlines the 
purpose of studying competitive advantages by more than one profitability measure. Our 
second finding was that the competitive advantages of high-leveraged firms became less 
stable during crisis than those of low-leveraged firms. This effect was as expected, based on 
unambiguous findings in previous literature. Last, we analyzed how sales growth affected the 
results, and found that the competitive advantages of firms with high sales growth became 
less stable during crisis than those of firms with low sales growth. This result was as 
expected. Further analysis of the two growth percentile extremes versus the medium growth 
percentile showed that the competitive advantages of both firms with high and low sales 
growth became less stable during crisis, than those of firms with medium sales growth. These 
results supported the hypotheses. Reasons for this were discussed, and we concluded that the 
firms in the interior range of growth rates were to be the least affected by recessions, while 
the firms with high pre-recession growth were the ones to be the most affected by crisis. The 
implication of these findings is that they can give directions for future studies of the 
relationships to be investigated in more detail. 
 
We conclude that firms’ competitive advantages are less stable in crisis, and more stable in 
booms, and that different firm characteristics affect the stability of firms’ competitive 
advantages in different ways. More specifically, firms with high debt ratios and/or high pre-
recession sales growth experience the most instability in competitive advantages during crisis. 
As for the effect of firm size, the results depend on the profitability measure used as basis for 
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competitive advantage. We believe that future research on the stability of firms’ competitive 
advantages and disadvantages should be conducted on an industry level to see how industry 
characteristics can affect the stability. We would also suggest conducting research on the 
sustainability of firms’ competitive advantages and disadvantages when the time horizon is 
suitable. 
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9. Appendices 
9.1 Appendix A: Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
Salgsinn = Sales revenue, in 1000 NOK 
Lonnsos = Labor costs and social expenses, in 1000 NOK 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Salgsinn 8626 8895 9165 9283 9511 9553 9705 9924 10000 10379 10599 10860 
Lonnsos 2588 2669 2750 2785 2853 2866 2911 2977 3000 3114 3180 3258 
(Source: Statistics Norway, 2012) 
 
9.2 Appendix B: Industry classification 
Industry groups based on two-digit NACE codes (2002) 
Code NACE Industry group 
1 Primærnæring 
2 Petroleum 
3 Industri 
4 
5 
Bygg 
Handel og hotell- og restaurantvirksomhet 
6 Utenriks sjøfart 
7 Transport 
8 Finans, forsikring 
9 Tjenester 
10 Helse 
11 Kultur, media  
12 IT 
 
Two-digit NACE codes 2002 Revision 
Code NACE Industry 
1 Jordbruk og tjenester tilknyttet jordbruk. Jakt og viltstell 
2 Skogbruk og tjenester tilknyttet skogbruk 
5 Fiske, fangst og fiskeoppdrett. Tjenester tilknyttet fiske, fangst og fiskeoppdrett  
10 Bryting av steinkull og brunkull. Utvinning av torv 
11 Utvinning av råolje og naturgass. Tjenester tilknyttet olje- og gassutvinning 
 97 
 
12 Bryting av uran- og thoriummalm 
13 Bryting av metallholdig malm 
14 Bergverksdrift ellers 
15 Produksjon av næringsmidler og drikkevarer 
16 Produksjon av tobakksvarer 
17 Produksjon av tekstiler 
18 Produksjon av klær. Beredning og farging av pelsskinn 
19 Beredning av lær. Produksjon av reiseeffekter, salmakerartikler og skotøy 
20 Produksjon av trelast og varer av tre, kork, strå og flettematerialer, unntatt møbler 
21 Produksjon av papirmasse, papir og papirvarer 
22 Forlagsvirksomhet, grafisk produksjon og reproduksjon av innspilte opptak 
23 Produksjon av kull- og petroleumsprodukter og kjernebrensel 
24 Produksjon av kjemikalier og kjemiske produkter 
25 Produksjon av gummi- og plastprodukter 
26 Produksjon av andre ikke-metallholdige mineralprodukter 
27 Produksjon av metaller 
28 Produksjon av metallvarer, unntatt maskiner og utstyr 
29 Produksjon av maskiner og utstyr 
30 Produksjon av kontor- og datamaskiner 
31 Produksjon av andre elektriske maskiner og apparater 
32 Produksjon av radio-, fjernsyns- og annet kommunikasjonsutstyr 
33 Produksjon av medisinske instrumenter, presisjonsinstrumenter, optiske 
instrumenter, klokker og ur 
34 Produksjon av motorvogner, tilhengere og deler 
35 Produksjon av andre transportmidler 
36 Produksjon av møbler. Annen industriproduksjon 
37 Gjenvinning 
40 Elektrisitets-, gass-, damp- og varmtvannsforsyning 
41 Oppsamling, rensing og distribusjon av vann 
45 Bygge- og anleggsvirksomhet 
50 Handel med, vedlikehold og reparasjon av motorvogner. Detaljhandel med drivstoff 
til motorvogner 
51 Agentur- og engroshandel, unntatt med motorvogner 
52 Detaljhandel, unntatt med motorvogner. Reparasjon av husholdningsvarer og varer 
til personlig bruk 
55 Hotell- og restaurantvirksomhet 
60 Landtransport og rørtransport 
61 Sjøtransport 
62 Lufttransport 
63 Tjenester tilknyttet transport og reisebyråvirksomheter 
64 Post- og telekommunikasjoner 
65 Finansiell tjenesteyting, unntatt forsikring og pensjonskasser 
66 Forsikring og pensjonskasser, unntatt trygdeordninger underlagt offentlig forvaltning 
67 Hjelpevirksomhet for finansiell tjenesteyting 
70 Omsetning og drift av fast eiendom 
71 Utleie av maskiner og utstyr uten personell. Utleie av husholdningsvarer og varer til 
personlig bruk 
72 Databehandlingsvirksomhet 
73 Forskning og utviklingsarbeid 
74 Annen forretningsmessig tjenesteyting 
 98 
 
75 Offentlig administrasjon, forsvar og trygdeordninger underlagt offentlig forvaltning 
80 Undervisning 
85 Helse- og sosialtjenester 
90 Avløps- og renovasjonsvirksomhet 
91 Interesseorganisasjoner ikke nevnt annet sted 
92 Fritidsvirksomhet, kulturell tjenesteyting og sport 
93 Annen personlig tjenesteyting 
95 Lønnet arbeid i privat sektor 
99 Internasjonale organer og organisasjoner 
(Source: Statistics Norway) 
 
Two-digit NACE codes 2007 Revision 
Code NACE Industry 
1 Jordbruk og tjenester tilknyttet jordbruk, jakt og viltstell 
2 Skogbruk og tjenester tilknyttet skogbruk 
3 Fiske, fangst og akvakultur 
5 Bryting av steinkull og brunkull 
6 Utvinning av råolje og naturgass 
7 Bryting av metallholdig malm 
8 Bryting og bergverksdrift ellers 
9 Tjenester tilknyttet bergverksdrift og utvinning 
10 Produksjon av nærings- og nytelsesmidler 
11 Produksjon av drikkevarer 
12 Produksjon av tobakksvarer 
13 Produksjon av tekstiler 
14 Produksjon av klær 
15 Produksjon av lær og lærvarer 
16 Produksjon av trelast og varer av tre, kork, strå og flettematerialer, unntatt møbler 
17 Produksjon av papir og papirvarer 
18 Trykking og reproduksjon av innspilte opptak 
19 Produksjon av kull- og raffinerte petroleumsprodukter 
20 Produksjon av kjemikalier og kjemiske produkter 
21 Produksjon av farmasøytiske råvarer og preparater 
22 Produksjon av gummi- og plastprodukter 
23 Produksjon av andre ikke-metallholdige mineralprodukter 
24 Produksjon av metaller 
25 Produksjon av metallvarer, unntatt maskiner og utstyr 
26 Produksjon av datamaskiner og elektroniske og optiske produkter 
27 Produksjon av elektrisk utstyr 
28 Produksjon av maskiner og utstyr til generell bruk, ikke nevnt annet sted 
29 Produksjon av motorvogner og tilhengere 
30 Produksjon av andre transportmidler 
31 Produksjon av møbler 
32 Annen industriproduksjon 
33 Reparasjon og installasjon av maskiner og utstyr 
35 Elektrisitets-, gass-, damp- og varmtvannsforsyning 
36 Uttak fra kilde, rensing og distribusjon av vann 
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37 Oppsamling og behandling av avløpsvann 
38 Innsamling, behandling, disponering og gjenvinning av avfall 
39 Miljørydding, miljørensing og lignende virksomhet 
41 Oppføring av bygninger 
42 Anleggsvirksomhet 
43 Spesialisert bygge- og anleggsvirksomhet 
45 Handel med og reparasjon av motorvogner 
46 Agentur- og engroshandel, unntatt med motorvogner 
47 Detaljhandel, unntatt med motorvogner 
49 Landtransport og rørtransport 
50 Sjøfart 
51 Lufttransport 
52 Lagring og andre tjenester tilknyttet transport 
53 Post og distribusjonsvirksomhet 
55 Overnattingsvirksomhet 
56 Serveringsvirksomhet 
58 Forlagsvirksomhet 
59 Film-, video- og fjernsynsprogramproduksjon, utgivelse av musikk- og lydopptak 
60 Radio- og fjernsynskringkasting 
61 Telekommunikasjon 
62 Tjenester tilknyttet informasjonsteknologi 
63 Informasjonstjenester 
64 Finansieringsvirksomhet 
65 Forsikringsvirksomhet og pensjonskasser, unntatt trygdeordninger underlagt 
offentlig forvaltning 
66 Tjenester tilknyttet finansierings- og forsikringsvirksomhet 
68 Omsetning og drift av fast eiendom 
69 Juridisk og regnskapsmessig tjenesteyting 
70 Hovedkontortjenester, administrativ rådgivning 
71 Arkitektvirksomhet og teknisk konsulentvirksomhet, og teknisk prøving og analyse 
72 Forskning og utviklingsarbeid 
73 Annonse- og reklamevirksomhet og markedsundersøkelser 
74 Annen faglig, vitenskapelig og teknisk virksomhet 
75 Veterinærtjenester 
77 Utleie- og leasingvirksomhet 
78 Arbeidskrafttjenester 
79 Reisebyrå- og reisearrangørvirksomhet og tilknyttede tjenester  
80 Vakttjeneste og etterforsking 
81 Tjenester tilknyttet eiendomsdrift 
82 Annen forretningsmessig tjenesteyting 
84 Offentlig administrasjon og forsvar, og trygdeordninger underlagt offentlig 
forvaltning 
85 Undervisning 
86 Helsetjenester 
87 Pleie- og omsorgstjenester i institusjon 
88 Sosiale omsorgstjenester uten botilbud 
90 Kunstnerisk virksomhet og underholdningsvirksomhet 
91 Drift av biblioteker, arkiver, museer og annen kulturvirksomhet 
92 Lotteri og totalisatorspill 
93 Sports- og fritidsaktiviteter og drift av fornøyelsesetablissementer 
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94 Aktiviteter i medlemsorganisasjoner 
95 Reparasjon av datamaskiner, husholdningsvarer og varer til personlig bruk 
96 Annen personlig tjenesteyting 
97 Lønnet arbeid i private husholdninger 
99 Internasjonale organisasjoner og organer 
(Source: Statistics Norway) 
 
9.3 Appendix C: Normality tests 
9.3.1 Normality tests for operating profit margin – basis year 2007 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Driftsmargin 18908 85,2% 3279 14,8% 22187 100,0% 
 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova 
Statistic df Sig. 
Driftsmargin ,294 18908 ,000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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9.3.2 Normality tests for ROA – basis year 2007 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
roa 18908 85,2% 3279 14,8% 22187 100,0% 
 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova 
Statistic df Sig. 
roa ,194 18908 ,000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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9.4 Appendix D: Comparison of median and mean after removing outliers 
In this appendix, we present graphs that show the differences between the median and the 
mean after outliers have been removed in accordance with sample criteria 8. This is done for 
the sample as a whole and for the top and bottom deciles used in the analyses on profitability. 
We wanted to show that the operation of removing outliers is sufficient in order to use the 
mean as the basis for our analyses throughout the study.  
 
 
FIGURE 32: OPERATING PROFIT MARGIN WITHOUT OUTLIERS - MEAN VS. MEDIAN 
 
FIGURE 33: ROA WITHOUT OUTLIERS - MEAN VS. MEDIAN 
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The graphs show that there are small differences between the mean and the median after 
outliers have been removed. This implies that the mean is no longer severely affected by 
extreme observation after observations +/- two standard deviations from the mean have been 
excluded from the sample. The mean and the median have very similar courses and this 
justifies our use of mean in the analyses throughout our study.  
 
 
FIGURE 34: OPERATING PROFIT MARGIN, PERCENTILE 1 AND 10 - MEAN VS. MEDIAN 
 
FIGURE 35: ROA, PERCENTILE 1 AND 10 - MEAN VS. MEDIAN 
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The graphs show that the mean and median of both operating profit margins and ROA for the 
high performers are almost identical in movement, and the difference between the two is 
minimal. The median for the low performers stays on a generally higher level than the mean, 
and the differences are somewhat larger for these firms. However, the differences are still 
very small. 
 
